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Richard S. Frase

Forty Years of American
Sentencing Guidelines:
What Have We Learned?

ABSTRACT

Since 1980, 22 state and federal jurisdictions have adopted sentencing
guidelines. Nineteen still have them. No two systems are alike. Experience
suggests that any well-designed system requires ﬁve core features: a
permanent, balanced, independent, and adequately funded sentencing
commission; typical-case presumptive sentences and departure criteria; a
hybrid sentencing theory that recognizes both retributive and crime control
purposes; balance between the competing beneﬁts of rules and discretion; and
sentence recommendations informed by resource and demographic impact
assessments. Balance is needed in terms of commission composition, between
conﬂicting sentencing purposes, between rules and discretion, and between
the inﬂuence of the commission, the legislature, and case-level actors.
Guidelines proponents disagree about a number of important issues. Some
relate to which crimes and sentencing issues should be regulated. Others
concern the design details that determine how the system actually works.
It is clear, however, that preguidelines regimes of unstructured, highly
discretionary sentencing are unacceptable and that commission-drafted
guidelines, endorsed by the American Bar Association and the American
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Law Institute, are the only successful sentencing reform model. In four
decades, no competing model of comparable detail and scope has been
seriously proposed.

Forty years ago, the Minnesota and Pennsylvania legislatures each created
a commission tasked with proposing statewide sentencing guidelines.1 In
1980, Minnesota became the ﬁrst state to implement such a system.
Pennsylvania’s guidelines took effect 2 years later. Since then, 18 other
states, the District of Columbia, and the federal courts have implemented commission-drafted guidelines,2 although some guidelines,
their parent commissions, or both were subsequently abolished.3 In
2017 the American Law Institute gave ﬁnal approval to the Model Penal
Code–Sentencing (MPCS) rules, which strongly endorsed legally binding guidelines developed and monitored by a permanent commission.
The American Bar Association’s Sentencing Standards (ABA 1994) likewise strongly endorsed this approach. In the last four decades, no competing sentencing reform model of comparable detail and scope has been seriously proposed, let alone implemented.
But there is no single, or even clear, “consensus” model of sentencing
guidelines and guidelines commissions. The Minnesota and Pennsylvania prototypes are quite different from each other in important respects.
1
The idea of commission-drafted sentencing guidelines was ﬁrst proposed in the early
1970s by federal judge Marvin Frankel (1973). The ﬁrst commissions were established in
Minnesota and Pennsylvania in 1978.
2
Those 18 states are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. In total (including Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Washington, DC, and the federal courts), 22 American state and federal jurisdictions have, or once
had, some form of commission-drafted, jurisdiction-wide guidelines. For further details on
how “guidelines” system is deﬁned in this essay, see the text at nn. 4 and 5.
3
Sentencing guidelines commissions were abolished, or left as nonguidelines commissions, in ﬁve states: the guidelines or successor laws are still in effect in Florida and Tennessee
despite abolition of the sentencing commission; in Louisiana and Missouri guidelines were
repealed but nonguidelines commissions remain; Wisconsin abolished both its guidelines
and its commission. Massachusetts has a sentencing commission and proposed guidelines that
the legislature has not approved but that many judges take into consideration. And, in addition to Louisiana and Missouri, there are sentencing or broader criminal justice commissions
without a charge to develop guidelines in Alaska, Connecticut, Illinois, New Mexico, and
New York. Finally, Nevada currently has a commission to consider writing guidelines (the
Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau: https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/InterimCommittee
/REL/Interim2017/Committee/1391/Meetings). For further information on the guidelines
systems that are still operating, as well as on states with nonguidelines commissions, visit
the University of Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center, Robina Institute of
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (Robina Institute 2018).
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The state and federal guidelines and commissions that were created later
are even more diverse in their goals, scope of coverage, and major structural features. In light of the new impetus given to guidelines reforms by
completion of the MPCS project, and growing opposition to the excesses of mass incarceration, now seems like a good time to review the
history and future of guidelines reforms. What have we learned about
what works and what does not? What structural and other policy choices
enjoy widespread support, and which continue to be vigorously debated?
What are the most important issues requiring additional research to inform these policy debates? What is the likely future of this and competing sentencing structures?
Here are my main ﬁndings and conclusions:
•

•

•

•

The diversity of guidelines structures and rules suggests a high degree of contingency in what American jurisdictions want in a sentencing system, or at least in what they can successfully implement and
sustain.
From a normative perspective, some guidelines structures are much
more likely to produce good sentencing policy and practice. Five essential features characterize a well-designed sentencing system: ﬁrst,
a permanent, balanced, independent, and adequately funded sentencing commission; second, speciﬁed typical-case presumptive sentences
and departure criteria; third, hybrid sentencing theory that recognizes
both retributive and crime control purposes; fourth, balance between
the competing beneﬁts of rules and discretion: rules promote uniformity and predictability; discretion promotes efﬁciency, ﬂexibility, and
case-speciﬁc justice; and ﬁfth, recommended sentences that are informed by resource and demographic impact assessments. In many
jurisdictions it will not be possible to implement all of these features
(although a few state systems have), but the more of them a system
has, the better.
A recurring theme is the need to maintain workable and reasonable
balances, not only in terms of commission makeup, and between conﬂicting sentencing purposes and between rules and discretion, but
also between the powers and inﬂuence of the sentencing commission
relative to the legislature and to judges, attorneys, and correctional
authorities.
Guidelines reformers have disagreed about a number of important
policy issues. Some relate to coverage—which crimes and sentencing
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issues should be regulated. Other issues relate to design—the necessary details that determine how the system actually works. There are
good arguments on both sides of each of these contested issues. On
some, one approach seems clearly preferable; on others, more research
is needed.
The preguidelines regime of unstructured, highly discretionary sentencing is unacceptable. Guidelines offer the only proven sentencing
reform model.

The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section I surveys
the wide variety of guidelines systems that currently exist in American
jurisdictions, showing their similarities and differences with respect to
major structural features and operation, identifying features recommended by the MPCS, and examining available data on the effects of
guidelines on sentencing practices, inmate populations, and achievement
of important reform and policy goals. Section II examines the most important policy issues raised by guidelines sentencing and seeks to identify
issues on which there is, or should be, broad agreement and issues that are
more contestable. Section III identiﬁes priority issues for research, including development of better cross-jurisdictional measures and efforts to
promote better understanding about how best to achieve widely shared
sentencing reform goals. Section IV considers the future of guidelines
sentencing.

I. Where, When, and What Kinds of Guidelines?
Several types of “structured” sentencing systems seek to reduce sentencing discretion and disparities ( US Department of Justice 1996, 1998),
and not all true guidelines are referred to as “guidelines.”4 For purposes
of this essay a “sentencing guidelines” system is one with three features.
First, judges are given a set of recommended sentences or sentence ranges
for most types of crime or at least most felonies. Second, the guidelines are
deemed to be appropriate in typical cases of that type (i.e., cases that do not
present aggravating or mitigating factors that might permit departure from
the recommendation). Third, they were developed by a legislatively created
sentencing commission (regardless of whether the rules are embodied in
4
For previous surveys of American guidelines systems, as of 2004 and 2012, see Frase
(2005; 2013, chap. 3). See also Tonry (1988; 1996, esp. chaps. 2 and 3).
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statutes, and even if the commission ceased to exist at some point after
the guidelines went into effect).
This deﬁnition excludes legislatively drafted presumptive sentences set
out in statutes like those that California and several other states adopted in
the mid- to late 1970s.5 Florida is a borderline case; its commissiondrafted guidelines were replaced in 1998 with statutory presumptive minimum sentences (Griset 1999). I include it as a guidelines state because its
current punishment code carries over elements of the former commissiondrafted guidelines system. Massachusetts is another borderline case; it is
included because, even though initial and revised commission-drafted
guidelines have not received legislative approval (Robina Institute 2018),
judges appear generally to follow the commission’s recommended sentences. In effect, the commission’s proposals are functioning like advisory
guidelines (Massachusetts Sentencing Commission 2014, pp. 44–45).
Finally, I include Ohio as a guidelines system since its entirely statutory
recommended sentence system was developed by a sentencing commission, even though it lacks a feature found in all other systems that meet
the deﬁnition: Ohio has nothing that could be called a criminal history
score or scoring system (Grifﬁn and Katz 2002; Robina Institute 2018).
A. Where and When
The 22 state and federal jurisdictions that have or once had sentencing
guidelines under my deﬁnition are shown in table 1, listed in order of the
initial effective dates of their commission-drafted guidelines, and also
showing the years when the guidelines commission was in operation.6
5
For further discussion of legislatively drafted presumptive sentence reforms, see
Tonry (1988) and Frase (2013). Some researchers have classiﬁed Alaska as a “guidelines”
system (National Center for State Courts 2008). I exclude Alaska because its statutory presumptive sentences were not developed by a commission (although they were later studied
and endorsed by a short-lived sentencing commission); they were drafted by the legislature
and supplemented with appellate case law that added additional presumptive sentences
(Carnes 1993).
6
Some of these states previously had guidelines drafted by courts or other agencies. Utah
implemented statewide felony guidelines, written by judicial and correctional authorities, in
1979 (Oldroyd 1994), but in 1998 these were replaced with commission-drafted guidelines.
Florida, Maryland, Michigan, and Virginia likewise had judicial guidelines that preceded
their commission-drafted guidelines. Maryland considers its current guidelines system to
have begun with the judicial guidelines that were implemented statewide, with legislative
approval, in 1983. Florida had commission-drafted guidelines from 1983 to 1998, which
were replaced with a statute that carried over some of the guidelines rules. Judicial guidelines in Michigan and Virginia were replaced by completely different commission-drafted
guidelines. For further details on each of these systems, see Robina Institute (2018).
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TABLE 1
Sentencing Guidelines Systems, Guidelines Commissions, and Model
Codes and Standards Recommending Guidelines.

Agency or Jurisdiction
ABA Sentencing Standards, 2nd ed.
Minnesota
Pennsylvania
Maryland
Florida
Washington
Wisconsin
Delaware
Federal
Oregon
Tennessee
Louisiana
ABA Sentencing Standards, 3rd ed.
Kansas
Arkansas
North Carolina
Virginia
Massachusetts
Ohio
Missouri
Michigan
Washington, DC
Alabama
ALI Revised Model Penal Code

Guidelines
Commissions:
Years in Operation
1978–
1978–
1996–
1982–97
1981–
1984–95, 2001–7
1984–
1984–
1985–
1986–95
1987–95
1989–
1993–
1990–
1994–
1994–
1990–
1993–2012
1994–2002, 2015–
1998–
2006–

(Commission’s)
Guidelines
Initial Effective Dates
Approved: Aug. 1979
May 1980–
July 1982–
July 1983–
1983–98, 1998–
July 1984–
1985–95, 2003–7
Oct. 1987–
Nov. 1987–
Nov. 1989–
Nov. 1989–
1992–95
Approved: Feb. 1993
July 1993–
Jan. 1994–
Oct. 1994–
Jan. 1995–
April 1996–
July 1996–
1997–2012
Jan. 1999–
June 2004–
Oct. 2006–
Sections approved: 2007,
2011, 2014, 2016,
and 2017

SOURCE.—Robina Institute (2018).

These systems vary considerably; moreover, several have made signiﬁcant changes over time. Some have expanded the scope of their guidelines. Delaware in 1990 eliminated parole release discretion; its guidelines
now determine prison duration and prison commitment. Alabama in
2013 made some of its guidelines rules—those that apply to nonviolent
crimes—legally binding rather than purely advisory. Other jurisdictions
have gone in the opposite direction. Florida replaced the tops of its
guidelines ranges with the almost-always-higher applicable statutory
maximums. Ohio and Tennessee in 2006 made their legally binding
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guidelines mostly advisory, to avoid the increased constitutional requirements, under Blakely v. Washington (542 U.S. 296 [2004]), for proof
of aggravating facts permitting upward departure from guidelines “typicalcase” sentence recommendations. For the same reason, the US Supreme
Court made the federal guidelines advisory, in U.S. v. Booker (543 U.S.
220 [2005]). Louisiana, Missouri, and Wisconsin completely abolished
their guidelines; Wisconsin did it twice. Subtracting those three states
leaves 19 state and federal jurisdictions that currently have a guidelines system meeting my deﬁnition.
Table 1 also shows when the American Bar Association (ABA) and the
American Law Institute (ALI) adopted their recommendations in favor
of commission-drafted guidelines. The second edition of the ABA’s
(1979) sentencing standards provided the rough outlines of a system
of guidelines drafted by an agency independent of the legislature and located in the judicial branch. The third edition (ABA 1994) provided
greater detail on the duties and organization of such an agency (and also
provided alternative standards for an agency located within the legislature to perform that function). Further details, and a strong endorsement of the independent agency concept, are contained in the ALI’s revised MPCS provisions; these were approved in ﬁve stages, beginning in
2007 and ending in 2017 with approval of the proposed ﬁnal draft containing all of the revised code sentencing provisions (ALI 2017).

B. Varieties of Guidelines
State and federal guidelines systems display considerable structural
variation on each of the dimensions discussed below. Except where otherwise noted, the sources for these summaries are jurisdiction-speciﬁc
proﬁles and multijurisdiction overviews available from the University
of Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center (Robina Institute 2018) or my compilation and interpretation of materials posted on
the center’s website.
1. The Guidelines Commission. These bodies vary in size, composition, duties, and policy-making powers relative to the legislature. The
commissions currently in operation have between seven and 31 members, with an average of about 17 ( Watts 2016). The membership always
includes judges and usually includes defense and prosecution representatives. The federal commission is unusual in its small size (seven
voting members) and composition: there is prosecution but not de-
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fense representation. Other frequent membership categories include
correctional ofﬁcials, legislators, police ofﬁcers, victim representatives,
and other “public” members. A few commissions reserve a spot for an
academic or other sentencing or correctional expert. In about a quarter
of the systems, members are appointed solely by the executive (governor
or president); the rest include judicial, legislative, or other appointing
authorities. In addition to drafting, monitoring, and revising the guidelines, most commissions collect and analyze data on sentences imposed
and use those data to project future prison populations ( Frase 1995;
Watts 2017). About half of the systems allow the commission’s initial
or amended guidelines to go into effect subject only to initial or later
legislative override. The remainder require afﬁrmative legislative enactment before any proposal or modiﬁed version can go into effect or require such approval within a limited period after the initial effective date
(Mitchell 2017).
2. Reform and Punishment Goals. All guidelines seek to reduce sentencing discretion and its resulting disparities, but only a few systems explicitly deﬁne an underlying normative framework—disparity relative to
what criteria? In particular, what punishment purposes and factors render two offenders “similarly situated” so that “disparity” exists if they receive different penalties?
Minnesota adopted a theory of “modiﬁed just deserts.” Sentences are
determined by a mix of retributive and crime control purposes. Both
kinds of purposes determine typical-case recommendations on prison
duration and whether the prison term will be immediately executed or
suspended (the “disposition” decision).7 Durational departures are governed solely by retributive values, while dispositional departures are
based on crime control considerations (Frase 2013). Washington went
further, giving greater emphasis to desert (Boerner and Lieb 2001,
pp. 84 –85).
Most guidelines systems pursue, and seek disparity reduction relative
to, all traditional sentencing purposes. Sometimes they state that sentences should be uniform and proportionate relative to offense severity
7
As noted below, Minnesota and a number of other guidelines systems deem an
offender’s desert to be enhanced in proportion to not only the seriousness of the conviction offense(s) but also the offender’s prior conviction record. These systems thus allow
the latter factor to increase the recommended prison duration (sometimes very substantially); prior record will also often make the difference between recommended prison
and recommended probation.
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and prior record, without specifying how each of those dimensions, and
the particular scales employed, relates to punishment goals.8 Minnesota
and several other systems expressly endorse the principle of sentencing
“parsimony”: a penalty should be no more severe than is necessary to
achieve its purposes adequately (see, e.g., MSGC 2018, sec. 1.A.5).
Another closely related question is whether the guidelines seek to encourage judges more consistently to apply existing sentencing norms
(“descriptive” or “historical” guidelines) or whether the guidelines are
intended to change some of those norms (“prescriptive” guidelines).
Even systems of the ﬁrst type, however, may recognize goals such as reduced racial disparity or the implementation of legislative mandates
(such as the numerous congressional directives in the 1984 Sentencing
Reform Act).9 Even prescriptive guidelines such as those in Minnesota
(which, like many guidelines reforms, sought to send more violent offenders to prison and fewer property offenders) are often heavily based
on prior practice (sometimes pursuant to legislative directive).10
Many guidelines reforms have recognized the goals of managing prison
and other correctional resources and avoiding prison overcrowding.
Minnesota pioneered this approach, taking advantage of the greater uniformity and predictability of sentencing under guidelines, and a sentencing
commission’s capacity to collect and analyze detailed data on sentencing
practices. The Minnesota legislature directed the new commission to “take
into substantial consideration . . . existing correctional resources, including
but not limited to the capacities of local and state correctional facilities.”11
The commission took this directive seriously and developed a prison bed
8
See, e.g., Or. Admin. R. 213-002-001(d): “the appropriate punishment for a felony
conviction should depend on the seriousness of the crime of conviction when compared
to all other crimes and the offender’s criminal history.”
9
See, e.g., 28 U.S. C. § 994(m) (2018): “The Commission shall insure that the
guidelines reﬂect the fact that, in many cases, current sentences do not accurately reﬂect
the seriousness of the offense.” See also USSC (2016, sec. 5H1.10): race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socioeconomic status are “not relevant in the determination of a
sentence.”
10
See, e.g., Minn. Laws 1978, c. 723, art. 1, § 9: commission “shall take into substantial
consideration current sentencing and release practices.”
11
Minn. Laws 1978, c. 723, art. 1, § 9. However, in 1989 this provision was given reduced weight; the current version of the commission’s mandate states that “in establishing
and modifying the Sentencing Guidelines, the primary consideration of the commission
shall be public safety. The commission shall also consider current sentencing and release
practices; correctional resources, including but not limited to the capacities of local and
state correctional facilities; and the long-term negative impact of the crime on the community” (Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subdiv. 5 [MSGC 2018]).

88

Richard S. Frase

impact model, which it used to ensure that predicted prison populations
would stay within 95 percent of existing and expected (already-funded)
prison capacity (Parent 1988). In contrast, the next-oldest guidelines system, Pennsylvania’s, did not recognize correctional resource management
as a reform goal; its guidelines were expected to increase the prison population (Tonry 1996, p. 50). But almost all subsequent guidelines reforms
have recognized the value of guidelines as a means of controlling prison
growth and avoiding overcrowding (Watts 2017); that has sometimes been
the primary goal in adopting guidelines (Frase 1995). The federal guidelines remain a notable exception, probably for two reasons: ﬁrst, in contrast
to most states, the federal budget need not be balanced, and deﬁcit spending is the norm; second, even dramatically increased prison costs constitute
a tiny fraction of the massive federal budget.
Although a number of guidelines systems (e.g., Alabama, Arkansas,
Kansas, Minnesota) have recognized the goal of reducing racial and ethnic disparities in sentencing, a few systems have gone further to ensure
that this goal is given serious consideration when guidelines and other
sentencing rules are written or revised (Porter 2014). These jurisdictions
have adapted their prison bed impact projection model so that it shows
the predicted effects of proposed new or revised sentencing rules on racial and ethnic disparities among prison inmate populations. If a rule is
found to increase disparity, its policy goals are scrutinized further and
the rule might then be rejected or modiﬁed.
3. Sentencing Decisions Covered by the Guidelines. Some of the most basic differences among American guidelines systems relate to their scope.
Most apply only to felony-level offenses; others also cover some or all
misdemeanors. The federal guidelines cover the most serious (class A)
misdemeanors, and in six states all non–petty misdemeanors are covered
(Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
Utah). I discuss other major differences in coverage below (whether judges
retain their traditional unfettered discretion to choose between consecutive and concurrent sentencing of multiple conviction offenses;
whether the guidelines regulate conditions of probation or other nonprison sanctions; and whether, because of abolition of parole release discretion, the guidelines govern both the imposition of active prison
sentences and the duration of prison terms).
4. Grids and Other Formats. Most American guidelines systems employ one or more two-dimensional grids to summarize and present
guidelines recommendations, with offense severity represented on the
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vertical axis (grid rows) and prior record on the horizontal axis (grid
columns).12 The federal system and several states have a single grid. Nine
jurisdictions have multiple grids (usually a “main” or “standard” grid, with
separate ones for sex, drug, or other offenses). Alabama, Florida, and
Virginia use worksheets rather than grids. Delaware and Ohio use neither
grids nor worksheets. The Delaware guidelines provide typical-case sentence ranges for each felony and misdemeanor crime class and type (violent, nonviolent), with speciﬁed mitigations and aggravations (e.g., for
acceptance of responsibility and prior convictions). Ohio statutes contain
general standards to help judges decide between prison and probation
and select a prison duration.
Among systems using grids, the formats vary considerably:13
•
•
•

•

•

number of offense severity levels: most have about 10, but Tennessee
has only ﬁve and the federal grid has 43;
number of criminal history categories: most have ﬁve to seven, but
Kansas, Oregon, and Washington have nine or 10;
widths of grid cells: on some grids the cell ranges are very wide and
overlap substantially, but on other grids the ranges are narrow and
hardly overlap at all;
use of a “disposition” line or other demarcation separating grid
cells with recommended executed prison sentences from cells
recommending probation: most grids have this kind of disposition
zone structure, but some have “border boxes” or entire grid zones
in which judges may, without departure, select from two or more disposition options such as prison, more intensive probation, or less intensive probation; and
display of separate aggravated or mitigated prison duration ranges:
most grids do not have such separate ranges.

Another basic difference between grids relates to the meaning of the
prison-duration numbers on the grid (almost always shown in months).
In most systems these numbers, and any higher or lower numbers chosen

12
Utah is the sole exception: on its grids, criminal history categories deﬁne the grid
rows, and offense severity deﬁnes grid columns. For further details, see Watts (2018a).
13
There are also purely visual differences in the order of offense severity levels and
criminal history categories. On most grids the highest-severity offenses are on the top
row of the grid and the highest criminal history category is the far-right column.
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by judges in case of departure, are the maximum prison terms offenders
will serve in prison, subject to reduction by good conduct credits, discretionary parole release if that was retained, or both. In Michigan, North
Carolina, and Pennsylvania the numbers on the grid, or terms chosen by
judges, represent minimum terms of imprisonment, which assume that
offenders will receive all available good-conduct credits or be paroled
at the earliest allowable time. In these systems, the maximum prison term
is then determined by other rules or by a formula (e.g., in North Carolina
the maximum term for less serious felonies is 120 percent of the minimum term).
The numbers shown on guidelines grids also vary in how recommended terms of imprisonment relate to statutory maximum and minimum prison terms. In most systems the longest recommended prison
term for offenders in the highest criminal history category is lower than
the statutory maximum for most or all of the applicable offenses;14 longer
prison terms may be imposed by means of an upward durational departure. In a few state systems, the tops of the ranges in each grid cell replace
previous statutory maximums. In North Carolina the maximum for each
grid cell is the number shown as the top of the “aggravated range.” In
Kansas upward durational departures cannot exceed twice the top of
the range for that cell. State systems sometimes take statutory minimum
terms into account when setting guidelines sentences, but more often the
guidelines were determined independently (and are overridden if a longer statutory minimum applies). In contrast, the federal commission took
a consistently more punitive approach: recommended guidelines sentences are always equal to or greater than any applicable or related mandatory minimum ( Tonry 1996, pp. 96–98; Hofer 2019).
5. Uncharged and Unconvicted Offenses. In all state guidelines systems,
the recommended sentence and almost all recognized grounds for departure are based on the offense or offenses of which the offender was
convicted (along with his or her criminal history). The federal guidelines
are unique in permitting crimes that did not result in conviction (because
they were dismissed, acquitted, or never charged) to enhance recommended sentences and justify upward departures.15

14
However, in some systems (e.g., District of Columbia, Florida, and Tennessee) the
tops of the ranges for highest-history offenders are equal to the statutory maximum.
15
See USSC (2016, sec. 1B1.3): deﬁnition of “relevant conduct” that may be considered
when calculating the recommended guidelines sentence, or when departing from that sen-
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6. Criminal History. Some of the most important differences among
guidelines systems concern prior convictions and other aspects of an
offender’s criminal history.16 Most systems have a separate criminal history score that forms one axis of the guidelines grid or grids (almost always the horizontal axis deﬁning grid columns); in nongrid systems, prior
record factors add points on one or more worksheets that determine the
form and severity of the recommended sentence. Some grid-based systems use a categorical rather than a points-based system. For example,
Kansas places offenders with three or more prior violent felonies in the
highest criminal history category (A); those with a single prior violent felony go in a midlevel category (D); category E is for offenders with three
nonviolent prior felonies and no violent felonies; offenders with only misdemeanors or no prior convictions are placed in the lowest category (I).
Criminal history scores and worksheet point systems vary in the kinds
of prior convictions and other components that are counted, how they
are weighted, and how strongly they affect recommended sentences.
These differences do not seem to be explained by differing views about
punishment purposes. A few systems explicitly justify such enhancements
on the basis of the assumed higher culpability or higher recidivism risk of
repeat offenders. Most seem simply to have assumed that prior record is an
“obviously” relevant sentencing factor (Roberts 2015b), basing criminal history scoring and weighting on rough, “back-of-the-envelope” calculations
(Tonry 2010, p. 93) or on prior record factors that judges in the jurisdiction traditionally considered (see, e.g., Parent 1988). The culpability-based
(retributive, just deserts) rationale is highly contested by punishment theorists (Roberts and von Hirsch 2010; Frase and Roberts, forthcoming,
chap. 1). And although there are abundant data showing that, in general,
an offender’s risk of recidivism is correlated with the extent of his or her
prior record, the strength of that relationship depends on many factors.
Very few guidelines systems have attempted to validate the risk-predictive
tence. Although most state guidelines allow upward departures to be based on aggravating facts
of the conviction offense(s) that were not proven or admitted by the defendant, such facts only
occasionally (e.g., weapon use, victim injury) increase the ordinary-case recommended sentence. State systems rarely permit aggravating facts based on nonconviction offenses to serve as
grounds for departure and almost never allow them to increase the recommended sentence.
16
For a survey of 18 state and federal guidelines systems that use some form of overall
criminal history score or point system, see Frase et al. (2015). For further discussion of the
rationales for criminal history enhancements, their intended and unintended effects, and
the most important needed reforms, see Hester et al. (2018) and Frase and Roberts (forthcoming).
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accuracy of their criminal history scores and score components (Frase and
Roberts, forthcoming, chap. 2).
All guidelines systems count prior adult felony convictions, and almost
all include at least some prior misdemeanor convictions and juvenile
court adjudications (Frase et al. 2015). The latter are often further limited
in various ways (e.g., by counting only juvenile offenses committed after
age 14 or that are felony-level or counting only qualifying adjudications if
the current [adult] offense was committed prior to age 25). Prior adult
misdemeanors usually exclude trafﬁc offenses and may be limited only
to designated crimes or the highest misdemeanor class. About two-thirds
of the systems include “custody status” (the offender was on probation,
parole, or certain other forms of criminal justice supervision, or was in
jail or prison, when he or she committed the offense being sentenced).17
Almost all point-based systems use some sort of weighting formula
that counts prior felonies more heavily than misdemeanors and juvenile
adjudications (Hester et al. 2018). Many point systems further limit the
weight of misdemeanor and juvenile priors by means of caps on the maximum number of points each can contribute to the total score (Mitchell
2015a, 2015b). Almost all systems weight prior felonies according to their
seriousness (the federal system weights according to prior sentences imposed); the weights used are quite varied (Hester 2015). On average, a
single prior felony moves the offender about one-third of the way across
the sentencing grid. In some systems a single serious felony can move the
offender two-thirds or even three-quarters of the way across. However,
about half of the systems limit eligibility for the highest criminal history
categories to offenders with one or several prior violent or high-severity
felonies. In these systems, nonviolent or low-severity felonies, no matter
how many, can move the offender only about halfway across the grid.
Many systems stop counting very old priors at some point; most such
“look-back” limits are stricter (shorter) for prior misdemeanors and juvenile adjudications. Some systems employ unconditional look-back limits
based solely on the passage of time, while other systems use “gap” rules
requiring that the offender have remained crime-free for a speciﬁed pe-

17
Several other states include custody status not as a criminal history score component,
but as a recognized aggravating factor that courts may consider (Roberts 2015a). A few systems also count whether the offender has ever violated the terms of community release or
has ever had release revoked (see, e.g., Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy 2018, p. 30).
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riod.18 However, more than half of systems count all or at least the most
serious prior felonies for the remainder of the offender’s life, despite evidence showing that very old convictions, and advancing age, are associated with lower recidivism risk (Frase and Roberts, forthcoming, chap. 3).
Even when a prior conviction is subject to a look-back limit, the period is
typically 10 or 15 years, and the “clock” usually does not begin to run until
a date long after the prior conviction was entered (e.g., when the offender
is discharged from probation, released from prison, or discharged from
postprison supervision). Thus, a 15-year limit can easily count convictions
20 or 25 years old.
A high criminal history score, category, or point total can have a dramatic
effect on the form and severity of an offender’s recommended sentence.
As to form, on most guidelines grids offenders convicted of medium- or
low-severity offenses are recommended for community-based sanctions
if they have little or no prior record; a more substantial record pushes them
across the grid into cells that recommend an executed prison sentence.
Since a high proportion of offenders are convicted at lower offense severity
levels and often have substantial prior records, many prison commitments
result from criminal history, not offense severity (in Washington, e.g., over
one-third of convicted offenders have recommended prison sentences for
this reason; Frase, Roberts, and Hester, forthcoming c).
Criminal history also dramatically increases the length of recommended
custody sentences. On average, across American guidelines systems, the
recommended custody sentence in the highest criminal history category
is six times longer than in the lowest, and in some guidelines states the
highest-history/lowest-history ratio is over 10. These substantial enhancements greatly increase the size and expense of prison populations (Frase,
Roberts, and Hester, forthcoming b). They also have other undesirable
consequences. They make sentences less proportional to the conviction
offense. They distort prison use priorities by sending many nonviolent
offenders to prison (since those offenders tend to have higher criminal history scores). They increase the number of aging, low-risk but high-cost
prison inmates (since, especially with lax or no look-back limits, older
offenders tend to have higher history scores). They increase racial disproportionality (since black and Native American offenders usually have
18
Recent-gap rules require that there have been no convictions in the period immediately before the current offense, whereas any-gap rules give offenders credit for earlier
crime-free periods. For further discussion of look-back rules, see Frase and Roberts (forthcoming, chap. 9).

94

Richard S. Frase

higher history scores). All of these effects may increase over time as a result
of rising criminal history scores.19
7. Other Offense- or Offender-Based Guidelines Criteria. Many systems
enhance penalties for certain crimes because of similarity between the current and prior offenses, but no system applies such a “patterning” rule
across the board (Roberts 2015c). Perhaps surprisingly, no system takes
into account whether the offender’s past and current crimes show a trend
toward increasing or decreasing severity. Perhaps most surprising of all,
very few systems factor in the offender’s current age or other known risk
and protective factors. The two systems that make the most use of such risk
factors consider them only as an adjustment after the recommended sentence has been determined on the basis of current offense severity and prior
record ( Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission 2018) or as a screening tool to identify offenders in need of additional offender-speciﬁc risk
and needs assessment (Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing 2018).20
8. Multiple Current Offenses. Sentencing theorists and policy makers
have traditionally focused on individual offenders being sentenced for a
single crime, but many offenders are sentenced for multiple crimes. Such
crimes can be multiple counts in a single case or convictions entered in
two or more cases sentenced at about the same time. Similar issues can
arise when the offender about to be sentenced is already serving a sentence
for a prior crime (Frase 2018a; see, generally, Ryberg, Roberts, and de
Keijser [2018]). Traditionally, this problem was dealt with by giving judges
total discretion to sentence multiple crimes fully concurrently, fully consecutively, or partially consecutively. About two-thirds of guidelines systems
take this approach (Frase 2015a, table 10.2). The remaining systems make
concurrent sentencing presumptive for many if not most cases; however,
these systems also recognize “concurrent-plus” options, including the following (Frase 2018a, pp. 205–7):
•

multiple crimes involving similar, “addable” harm amounts (dollar
losses to victims; quantity of drugs or other contraband) are deemed
to be “one big crime”;

19
See, e.g., MSGC (2017, table 10), reporting substantial declines in the proportion of
offenders with zero history and substantial increases for the highest scores.
20
Some state systems, by either case law or guidelines provisions, allow courts to depart
downward from a recommended prison sentence on the basis of a ﬁnding of the offender’s
particular amenability to probation or unamenability to prison or to depart upward on the
basis of the offender’s unamenability to probation (Frase and Roberts, forthcoming, chap. 3).
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multiple closely related crimes are treated as aggravating factors for
the most serious of the crimes;
multiple counts are included when computing the criminal history
score applied to some or all current offenses; or
additional counts increase recommended sentence severity according
to other formulas (e.g., under the federal guidelines, multiple counts
can cause offense severity to be increased by up to ﬁve levels).

9. Suspended Sentences and Other Ways of Structuring Nonprison Sanctions. Most American guidelines systems impose probation and other
community-based felony sentences as conditions of a suspended prison
sentence (Frase 2018b). Some require the court to ﬁrst pronounce a prison
sentence and then suspend its execution. In others, community-based sentences can be imposed only when the court suspends imposition of sentence (in effect, deferring completion of the sentencing process). In a
third group, a community sentence can be a condition of either a suspendedexecution prison sentence (SEPS) or an order suspending imposition
of sentence (SIS). A few states (e.g., Oregon and Washington) often impose community sanctions as stand-alone penalties rather than as conditions of either kind of suspended sentence.21
Each approach employs a different set of procedures to sanction violations of the conditions of release.22 Under the SEPS option, the
suspended prison term may be executed as a sanction for violation, with
minimal hearing and fact-ﬁnding safeguards. If a sentencing court invokes the SIS option and later wishes to use imprisonment to sanction
violations of release conditions, it must hold a standard sentencing hearing, with all of the procedural requirements and sentencing alternatives
that would apply if a hearing had been held when the community sanction was imposed. When probation or other nonprison penalties are
imposed as stand-alone penalties, not as conditions of a SEPS or SIS
suspended sentence, prison is usually not available as a sanction for violation of release conditions. Violations are sanctioned by short jail terms,

21
Although Washington purported to abolish suspended sentences as part of its
guidelines reform, formal SEPS or de facto SIS were retained for certain groups of
offenders (Frase 2013, chap. 3).
22
For further discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the probation-structure
approaches described in the text, see Frase (2018b).
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home detention, increased release conditions, or other community-based
alternatives.23
Regardless of the form in which community-based sanctions are imposed, however, judges in all guidelines systems retain broad or even total
discretion when deciding whether to revoke release and in choosing
among available sanctions for violations of release conditions.
10. Conditions of Nonprison Sentences. Most guidelines rules focus on
prison commitment and prison duration and provide little or no guidance
or structure concerning conditions of community-based sentences. Systems that attempt to regulate such sentences usually do so in one of two
ways:24 by deﬁning two or more broad levels of sanction intensity that
may be imposed for different groups of offenders or by providing a maximum or a permitted range of local jail custody, with rules translating
nonjail community penalties into jail days. North Carolina and Pennsylvania use the ﬁrst of these approaches: in grid cells in which prison is not
the sole recommended sentence, judges may choose from one or more
sanction types: intensive community sanctions, less restrictive sanctions,
or in some grid cells, either.25 Oregon and Washington use the second
approach. Each nonprison cell on the Oregon grid contains two numbers: the maximum number of jail days allowed without departure and
the maximum number of sanction units (including any jail days imposed,
as well as units contributed by other community sanctions that the judge
has imposed). The Washington grid provides a custody range in every
cell, but some ranges call for durations (a year or less) that would be
served in a local jail. In addition, “alternative conversion” formulas permit some or all of the required jail time to be converted into work release,
part-time custody, home detention, community service, a ﬁne, or a combination.
11. Departures. Some states (e.g., Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia) have
no stated standard that judges must meet before departing from recom23
Five guidelines systems strongly discourage the use of prison as a sanction for probation violations. Oregon and Washington often impose stand-alone probation orders, with
designated jail sanctions for violations and no option of revoking a suspended sentence.
North Carolina, Utah, and the federal system retain the revocation option but discourage
its use; probation is combined with a suspended sentence, which could be revoked, but courts
are encouraged (and for some violations are required) to use shorter custodial backup
sanctions.
24
For further discussion, see Frase (2013, chap. 3) and Robina Institute (2018; North
Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington “proﬁles”).
25

In some of these cells, judges also have the option of imposing a prison sentence.
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mended guidelines sentences. When a standard is stated, it sometimes requires only that the case be “atypical” (Arkansas Sentencing Commission
2018, p. 1) or that there are “aggravating” or “mitigating” circumstances
(Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211E, § 3(a)(2) [2018]). However, a number of
states adhere to a stricter standard, requiring the presence of “substantial
and compelling” circumstances (e.g., Delaware, Minnesota, and Washington; Robina Institute 2018).
The departure standard under the federal guidelines requires that the
case involve aggravating or mitigating circumstances “of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the sentencing commission in formulating the guidelines” (USSC 2016, § 5K2.0). Given the
extremely detailed nature of the federal guidelines, this standard strongly
discouraged departures in the pre-Booker period when the guidelines
were legally binding. The pre-Booker guidelines were also very strict with
respect to mitigation based on offender cooperation. Offenders who
show “acceptance of responsibility” (almost always in the form of a guilty
plea) may receive at most a three-level reduction in their offense severity
level, on a grid that contains 43 levels (§ 3E). Offenders who provide
“substantial assistance” to law enforcement can receive sentence mitigation only upon a motion by the government (§ 5K1). In all of these ways,
the federal guidelines (especially pre-Booker) strike a balance too heavily
weighted toward commission or prosecution power, at the expense of
judges and defense attorneys.
The varying departure standards reﬂect differing views about how
much discretion trial judges should have and about which sentencing
purposes should be considered or given priority.
Most systems provide lists of allowed grounds for departure and sometimes lists of forbidden criteria (especially race, gender, and family or
socioeconomic status). The allowed grounds tend to focus on factors that
make the conviction offense more or less serious than a typical case,
which implies a preference for retributive punishment goals. But in a
number of states, the lists include offender factors such as amenability to supervision or treatment that are more relevant to risk-based,
crime prevention goals.26 And even in states that give strong emphasis to

26
In North Carolina, listed mitigating factors include defendant supports his or her
family; defendant has a support system in the community; defendant has a positive employment history or is gainfully employed; and defendant “has a good treatment prognosis and
a workable treatment plan is available” (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16(e) [2013]). In
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retributive goals, both in general and in lists of departure factors, courts
have sometimes recognized nonretributive, offender-based departure
grounds such as “particular amenability to probation.”27
Only a few systems expressly give courts power to depart based on
atypical aspects of the offender’s prior record.28 This is surprising, given
the universal endorsement of departures based on atypical aspects of the
conviction offense (and the fact that offense and prior record are the two
primary determinants of recommended sentences). Finally, some guidelines systems have special rules that expand departure powers (e.g., by
providing that certain deviations are not deemed departures) or that limit
departure powers (e.g., by providing that upward durational departures,
except in very unusual cases, cannot exceed twice the recommended
prison term for a typical case).

Utah, the listed aggravating circumstances include “previous willful inability to comply
in less restrictive setting . . . willful failure to attend or to participate in appropriate educational, vocational, or treatment programs . . . willful failure to obtain and/or maintain veriﬁable lawful employment . . . [and] regular association with individuals engaged in criminal or unlawful behavior”; listed mitigating circumstances include that the offender “has
demonstrated compliance with all pretrial conditions . . . is engaged in community based
supervision and/or treatment services consistent with a validated risk and needs assessment . . . his current living environment is stable and supportive of offense speciﬁc interventions which do not enable continued criminal or unlawful conduct . . . is engaged in
positive, supportive, pro-social relationships . . . is engaged in positive, supportive, prosocial community activities . . . [and] has implemented positive educational or employment
plans” (Utah Sentencing Commission 2017, p. 31). See also Ohio Rev. Stat. § 2929.12
(D): list of factors “indicating that the offender is likely to commit future crimes” includes
the following: that the offender “has not responded favorably” to prior juvenile court
adjudications or adult court sanctions and that the offenders has shown “a pattern of drug
or alcohol abuse that is related to the offense” and refuses to acknowledge the pattern, or
refuses to accept treatment for it.
27
The Minnesota case law allowing “amenability” and “unamenability” departures is
summarized in Frase (2005). Such departures have also been recognized by courts in
Kansas (Frase 2013, chap. 3).
28
The federal guidelines’ “inadequacy of criminal history” provision permits departure
up or down if the offender’s criminal history score “substantially” understates or overstates
“the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant
will commit other crimes” (USSC 2016, secs. 4A1.3(a)(1) and 4A1.3(b)(1)). Three states
authorize adjustments in one direction only. Washington permits upward departure if the
omission of certain prior crimes from the offender’s criminal history score yields a recommended sentence that is “clearly too lenient” (Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9.94A.535(2)(b)–
(d) 2013). A similar Pennsylvania provision, Adequacy of the Prior Record Score, permits
the sentencing court to consider prior convictions and juvenile adjudications or dispositions
that were not counted in the calculation of the score (204 Pa. Code § 303.5(d)). Minnesota
permits downward departure where the offender’s prior convictions were all entered in a single court appearance (medium-low current offense severity) or in one or two court appearances (low offense severity; MSGC 2018, sec. 2.D.3.a(4)).
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12. Degree to Which the Guidelines Are Legally Binding and Available Enforcement Methods. It is sometimes said that guidelines are either “mandatory” or “advisory” (see, e.g., U.S. v. Booker [543 U.S. at 233]), but these
terms are misleading. Very few guidelines rules are “mandatory” in the
way in which a mandatory minimum sentence statute is (judges can depart from guidelines), nor are there two homogeneous types of guidelines. The degree of binding force is best seen as a continuum, not a simple mandatory-advisory dichotomy. It is better to ask about the degree to
which a given system’s typical-case recommendations and departure
standards are formally or in practice legally binding on judges. Relevant
factors include the extent to which they are enforced by active appellate
review, procedural requirements to state reasons for departure, and other
factors tending to encourage compliance.
Legally binding systems with active appellate review, generating a
large body of appellate case law, are found in Kansas, Minnesota, Oregon,
and Washington. The guidelines recommendations in these states, however, are only presumptive, not mandatory; trial courts retain considerable
discretion as to both the type and the severity of sanctions. Appellate review does not appear to have unduly limited trial court discretion.29
At the other end of the continuum are systems in which the guidelines
recommendations and departure standards are purely advisory (at least as
a formal matter), allowing judges to ignore the recommendations and impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum for that offense (and at or
above the statutory minimum, if any). Examples of jurisdictions following this model include Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Utah, and Virginia. The guidelines in these
systems are described as “voluntary” or “advisory,” and departures are
not subject to appeal.
Numerous variations lie between these polar extremes (for further details, see Frase [2015b]). Some purely advisory systems have features that
encourage judges to follow the guidelines. These include informal peer
or political pressure generated by publication of judge-speciﬁc departure
rates or by location in a small, geographically concentrated jurisdiction
where judges are well known to each other (Ulmer 2019). Conversely,
some legally binding guidelines leave judges with very broad or even

29
Reitz (1997, pp. 1458–71) compares appellate review of sentences in the Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, and federal guidelines systems.
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complete discretion in certain respects, thus functioning, in those contexts, more like an advisory system.
13. Prison Release and Postprison Supervision. Eleven guidelines jurisdictions (Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, US federal courts, and
Washington) have abolished parole release discretion for all or most offenders (Robina Institute 2018). Inmates serve the entire executed prison
term subject only to reduction for good conduct (which usually includes
completion of in-prison programming and compliance with disciplinary
rules). Eight guidelines states (Alabama, Arkansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Utah) retain discretionary
parole release for most offenders serving felony sentences. Five of those
states (all but Arkansas, Massachusetts, and Tennessee) use or are in the
process of developing parole release guidelines (Watts 2018b).
In parole abolition systems, good-time reductions vary from as little as
15 percent (e.g., the federal system and the District of Columbia) to as
much as 50 percent for some offenders (e.g., Washington); in many
states it is 33 percent. In these systems, most offenders spend some time
under postrelease, parole-like supervision. Some abolition states (e.g.,
Minnesota) retain the traditional parole-based rule that both the period
of supervision and the possible prison term if release is revoked are equal
to the remaining unserved prison sentence (i.e., the amount of goodconduct credit). In the federal system and several states (e.g., Washington, Oregon, and Kansas) periods of postprison supervision and allowable custody terms in case of revocation are independent of the prison
sentence and usually depend on the seriousness of the offense. In North
Carolina, postprison supervision periods are quite short, in comparison
to traditional parole terms: either 9 or 12 months, depending on the offense severity level (Robina Institute 2018).
As with probation, few guidelines rules limit the conditions of postprison supervision. Almost no rules regulate decisions to revoke release
or impose other sanctions for violations of release conditions.
C. Summary: Major Similarities and Differences
The preceding summary reveals a number of similarities and differences in guidelines systems. Some features (e.g., identifying management
of prison resources as a goal) are found in almost all. However, state systems differ from each other in important ways (e.g., in the extent to which
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prison bed or other resource-impact assessments are used to shape
guidelines rules, not just to warn of overcrowding after the rules are written without regard to resource impact). The differences between the federal system and most state systems are even greater (e.g., enhancement of
recommended sentence severity based on unconvicted offenses).
D. Major Features of State Guidelines Reforms Embodied
in Model Rules and Standards
Several model codes and standards have endorsed the concept of sentencing guidelines drafted and monitored by an independent sentencing
commission. The MPCS is the most detailed proposal (ALI 2017; Robina
Institute 2018). The MPCS includes features found in well-developed
state guidelines systems and some added features not found in any current system. Those modeled on state systems suggest a degree of consensus on some sentencing policy issues, at least among practitioners and
scholars most interested in sentencing policy. The added features are
worthy of serious consideration, debate, and further research.
1. MPCS Features Found in Well-Developed State Guidelines Systems.
The sentencing commission proposed by MPCS is a permanent, broadly
representative body charged with drafting and monitoring guidelines,
conducting research, and maintaining data on sentencing. Impact assessments are required when drafting or modifying guidelines rules and to
periodically assess operations of existing rules; these assessments include
ﬁscal impacts and effects on racial and ethnic disproportionality in prison
populations. The MPCS expressly adopts a hybrid, limiting retributive
sentencing theory. The offender’s deserved punishment sets upper and
lower limits on penalty severity, within which crime control purposes
are pursued “when reasonably feasible.” A general principle of parsimony
directs that the sentence be “no more severe than necessary to achieve the
applicable purposes [of punishment]” (ALI 2017, sec. 1.02(2)(a)).
The proposed guidelines cover all crimes, including misdemeanors.
Limits are placed on criminal history enhancements and consecutive sentencing of multiple current offenses. The use at sentencing of validated
risk assessment instruments is encouraged. Probation, ﬁnes, and other
nonprison sanctions can be imposed as stand-alone penalties, without being a condition of a suspended execution or suspended imposition sentence. Recommended sentences are legally binding, not purely advisory.
Departure sentences are subject to a moderate degree of appellate review;
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nondeparture sentences are subject to discretionary review. Parole release discretion is abolished, but inmates may reduce their prison terms
by up to 15 percent for good conduct and another 15 percent for program
participation. Most released inmates are subject to a period of postprison
supervision; the period of supervision and the permissible revocation
sanction for violation of release conditions do not depend on the remaining unserved prison term.
2. MPCS Features Not Found in Existing Guidelines Systems. Suggested
guidelines rules or principles for legislation to authorize such rules are
provided for a number of matters not regulated by any existing system:
adult court sentencing of crimes committed when the offender was a juvenile; forfeitures, restitution, and other onerous economic sanctions;
pretrial diversion (deferred prosecution or deferred adjudication); and
collateral consequences of conviction. Appellate courts are authorized
to reverse disproportionately severe sentences, even if the sentence does
not exceed constitutional proportionality limits. Mandatory minimum
sentences are strongly discouraged, and where they still apply, trial courts
may depart below the minimum in exceptional cases. There are multiple
“second-look” sentencing provisions, permitting release from prison or
reduction of the term (including mandatory terms) based on age or inﬁrmity, other changed circumstances, or overcrowding of prison, jail, or supervision populations. The commission is directed to conduct an omnibus review of how the guidelines are working; the suggested frequency is
every 10 years.

E. Effects of Guidelines Reforms
How well have guidelines achieved their goals? In particular, have sentencing disparities—the original impetus for structured sentencing
reforms—been reduced? And since almost all guidelines systems originally or eventually identiﬁed correctional resource management as a reform goal, have those systems had slower rates of growth in prison populations, with fewer problems of prison overcrowding?
1. Disparity Reduction. Answering this question is very difﬁcult, for a
variety of reasons. First, one would need to compare sentencing before
and after implementation of the guidelines (while attempting to control
for other changes in the system), but preguidelines data are usually not
available. In the few cases in which they are, researchers have generally
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concluded that disparities were reduced, at least in state guidelines systems (see, e.g., Miethe and Moore 1985; Tonry 1996). Second, most
evaluations of pre- versus postguidelines sentencing have measured disparity by examining compliance and departure rates relative to the guidelines deﬁnitions of factors (primarily guidelines offense severity ranking
and prior record score) that are deemed to render two offenders “similarly
situated.” That baseline, however, biases the comparison in favor of ﬁnding “success” in disparity reduction; preguidelines sentencing might very
well have been just as consistent relative to the accepted, highly offenderbased criteria of that time (Doob 1995; Tonry 1996). Third, almost all
pre- and postguidelines comparisons are based on the offense of conviction, even though it might be expected—and in many systems has been
clearly documented—that prosecution charging and plea bargaining practices changed under the guidelines (Frase 1993; Tonry 1996). Where “real
offense” data are available, they tend to show a lesser degree of “improvement” in disparity reduction (again, measured relative to guidelines criteria) than appears when pre- and postguidelines disparity are examined relative to conviction offenses (Frase 1993).
Finally, measures of disparity and disparity reduction based on rates of
compliance with the guidelines are very difﬁcult to compare across
jurisdictions, because of substantial variations in what crimes are covered
by the guidelines and, even more importantly, what qualiﬁes as a “departure” ( Tonry 1996). Guidelines grids and worksheets vary substantially
in how wide a range is provided, for each grid cell or other offense/offender group, within which judges may sentence without departing.
Moreover, some guidelines use border boxes and other special rules that
either give judges multiple dispositional options (prison, intensive probation, regular probation) or deﬁne certain deviations from guidelines
recommendation as nondepartures. For example, Washington has a
“ﬁrst-offender waiver” provision and several other options for mitigation without formally departing; if those mitigations were treated as
departures, departure rates would be higher. A further problem with
cross-jurisdictional comparisons results from the very different approaches jurisdictions have taken when designing their guidelines. A system in which the guidelines seek to model prior sentencing and parolerelease practices (descriptive or historical guidelines) would be expected
to have higher compliance rates than a system in which the guidelines
seek to change prior practice (prescriptive guidelines).
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Subject to the major caveats just stated, here are some illustrative recent data on compliance rates (showing the year the cases were sentenced in brackets):30
•

•

•

•
•

District of Columbia [2017] (District of Columbia Sentencing Commission 2018, pp. 40–52): 97.2 percent of sentenced felony counts
were “compliant” (including 2.4 percent that were plea-agreed sentences, some of which would otherwise have been departures, 0.7 percent that were deemed compliant because sentenced concurrently
with another count receiving an equal or longer sentence, and 1.5 percent that were deemed “compliant departures” because the court stated
listed aggravating or mitigating factors).
Federal courts [ﬁscal year (FY) 2017] (USSC 2018, table N): 49.1 percent of sentences were “within” the guidelines; that is, they were neither departures under guidelines rules nor “variances” permitted by the
Booker decision rendering the guidelines “advisory.” However, some of
the not-within sentences are required by statutory mandatory minimums that are higher than the top of the guidelines range (Hofer
2019); and more than one-sixth of the not-within sentences were entered under a special mitigation rule applicable to “early disposition”
programs that are designed to expedite guilty pleas in nonserious immigration cases.
Kansas [FY 2017] (Kansas Sentencing Commission 2018, p. 65): 79.1
percent of cases had no departure as to either prison disposition or
prison duration, including 14.1 percent that were sentenced within
a “border box” permitting either prison or a nonprison sentence.
Minnesota [2016] (MSGC 2017, p. 23): 74 percent of cases had no
departure as to either prison disposition or prison duration.
Pennsylvania [2016] (Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing 2017,
p. 41): 89 percent of cases were deemed to be in “conformity” with the
guidelines and not “departures,” including 6 percent sentenced in
the “aggravated” sentencing range and 8 percent sentenced in the
“mitigated” range; excluding the latter two groups, 75 percent of cases
were sentenced within the “standard” sentencing ranges shown on the

30
For an earlier review of compliance rates in several guidelines systems, see Tonry
(1996, pp. 33–39).
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guidelines grids (all of these ﬁgures include misdemeanor crimes,
which have higher compliance rates than felonies [ Tonry 1996]).31
Virginia [FY 2017] ( Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission 2017,
p. 12): 81.2 percent of sentences were in compliance with the guidelines as to both prison disposition and duration (including, as compliant, variances based on the commission’s validated risk assessment
tools or statutory diversion options, sentences within 5 percent of the
recommended duration, and sentences to time served in pretrial detention where the guidelines call for probation).
Washington [FY 2017] (Washington State Caseload Forecast Council
2018, p. 33): 94.8 percent of sentences were within the standard range
or were outside that range but not deﬁned as “departures” (81 percent
were within the standard range).

Note that adjusted compliance rates (excluding cases that would be
counted as departures in other systems) are not consistently higher in
the three jurisdictions with legally binding guidelines and frequent appellate review (Kansas, Minnesota, and Washington) than they are in the
four systems with advisory or only loosely binding guidelines (District
of Columbia, federal, Pennsylvania, and Virginia). The highest and lowest adjusted compliance rates are found in advisory guidelines systems.
The District of Columbia, with the highest compliance rates, has descriptive guidelines (based on prior practice), very wide grid cell ranges,
and a relatively small and geographically concentrated judiciary. The
lowest compliance rate is in the federal system, whose guidelines have
probably been more unpopular with judges than guidelines in any other
jurisdiction.
2. Prison Population Growth. All US jurisdictions experienced substantial increases in prison populations and incarceration rates from
the early 1970s until at least the mid-2000s. Several studies have found
that states with sentencing guidelines, especially those that also abolished
31
Although the Pennsylvania guidelines apply to most nontrafﬁc misdemeanors,
misdemeanors of the ﬁrst and second class carry maximum penalties of more than 1 year,
which would be considered a felony penalty in most other states. However, third-degree
misdemeanors (maximum penalty: 1 year) are comparable to misdemeanors in other states;
these crimes (ranked at the lowest severity level, Offense Gravity Score p 1) constituted
29 percent of cases sentenced under the guidelines in 2016, and they had a “conformity”
rate of 97 percent (Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing 2017, p. 83). Excluding these
cases, the overall conformity rate falls from 89 percent to 86 percent (data on the use of the
aggravated and mitigated sentencing ranges are not reported by offense severity level).
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parole release discretion, had slower rates of growth (Reitz 2011, pp. 154–
55). Reitz reports that from the year in which each state abolished parole
discretion, through 2009, all nine states with parole-abolition guidelines had slower-than-average rates of prison growth than the average
for all states during the same periods (p. 153);32 if the federal system is
included, all 10 parole-abolition guidelines systems had slower-thanaverage growth.33
Of course, this was not a controlled experiment. Jurisdictions were not
randomly assigned to the parole-abolition-guidelines “treatment” group.
Other features of many of those guidelines systems—including the same
good-government concerns that led to adoption of parole-abolition
guidelines—may have contributed to slower prison growth (Zimring
2005, pp. 336–37).
Another potential problem with the 10-out-of-10 ﬁnding reported
above is that it is based on comparison of absolute increases in the number of prisoners per capita (per 100,000 population). On this basis prison
growth in Minnesota, for example, is much less than all-states growth;
from 1980 to 2009 Minnesota’s per capita rate rose by 141 (from 49
to 190), while the all-states rate grew by 314 (from 129 to 443; Carson
2018). But prison growth can also be measured in relative or percentage
terms (see, e.g., Zimring 2010; Pew Charitable Trusts 2018). In other
contexts, especially when comparing jurisdictions, growth over time is
usually expressed in percentage terms. We usually say that the murder
rate in city X increased by 10 percent, while the rate increased by 5 percent in city Y. We do not say that the rate increased by two murders per
100,000 residents in city X and three murders per 100,000 residents in
city Y.
Comparing prison growth in percentage terms can yield quite different results. Minnesota’s prison rate increased by 288 percent: its 2009
rate was 3.88 times its 1980 rate. That percentage increase was a bit
higher than the 243 percent growth in all states during these years.
For some purposes it makes sense to measure prison growth in per
capita units, or even in absolute numbers of inmates. Such measures em32
The nine state guidelines systems are Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Minnesota, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington.
33
For annual federal and state prison rates from 1978 through 2016, see Carson (2018).
Another parole-abolition guidelines jurisdiction, the District of Columbia, is excluded
from the analysis here since most of its custody-sentenced offenders are housed by the federal Bureau of Prisons, which provides no separate breakdown of DC and non-DC
inmates.
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phasize the ﬁscal and human costs of escalating prison populations and
show which jurisdictions are making the largest contributions to nationwide prison growth (Reitz 2018). But if we want to understand changes in
prison populations and the factors that make those populations grow
faster or slower in different jurisdictions, we need to examine growth
in percentage terms. Equal percentage growth provides a better baseline
for comparison: whatever caused Minnesota to have a very low incarceration rate at the outset would likely also cause Minnesota to increase its
rate less than states that started at much higher levels. If, as happened, the
national rate increased by 300 units from 150 to 450 per 100,000, we
would not expect Minnesota’s rate to increase from 50 to 350 (a 600 percent increase). If it did, we would immediately want to know: What
changed in Minnesota?
Most of the parole-abolition guidelines systems come out the same under the absolute and percentage change measures, but two systems besides Minnesota come out differently: Kansas and the federal system.
Both had slower-than-average prison growth when measured by the increased number of per capita units but higher-than-average growth when
measured in percentage terms (Carson 2018). Thus, in percentage terms,
seven of the 10 parole-abolition guidelines systems had below-average
rates of prison growth.34
Here is some further detail on the three parole abolition systems with
above-average growth. Kansas was only slightly higher than the national
average following implementation of that state’s guidelines in 1993. Its
rate had risen 37 percent by 2009, compared with the all-states rise of
34 percent (Carson 2018).
Minnesota’s higher-than-average increase from 1980 to 2009 (288 percent compared with 243 percent for all states) appears largely to be

34
This record was better than in the six states that abolished parole without adopting
guidelines: Arizona, California, Indiana, Illinois, Maine, and Wisconsin (Reitz 2011,
pp. 51–52). (As shown in table 1, Wisconsin had advisory guidelines for less than half of
the period 1999–2009 after parole discretion was abolished.) Of these six states, only
Maine experienced below-average percentage growth in its prison rate; three (Illinois,
Arizona, and Wisconsin) had average or slightly above-average growth; the other two
(California and Indiana) had much greater-than-average growth (Carson 2018). The eight
states that adopted sentencing guidelines but retained parole release discretion provide another point of comparison: half of these states had above-average rates of prison growth
after implementing guidelines (Alabama, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee); Utah
had average growth; Maryland, Massachusetts, and Michigan had below-average growth
(Carson 2018).
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explained by higher-than-average increases in felony caseloads.35 And
there were several additional reasons to expect above-average growth in
Minnesota after 1980. First, rates tend to grow faster in states with the
lowest rates than in high-rate states (Zimring and Hawkins 1991, p. 221;
Reitz 2018). There are plausible reasons for this. Low-rate states probably have more marginal offenders who can be shifted from probation to
prison (in high-rate states, those offenders are mostly already in prison).
Low-rate states are also likely to have more room in their budgets to increase prison costs. Another explanation is more speculative but seems
plausible (and testable). In an era of rising sentence severity, low-rate
states may feel pressure to “catch up,” if only to allay the public’s fear that
“all the bad guys will come here to commit their crimes.”
Second, Minnesota is a relatively prosperous state and could have
afforded even greater increases in its prison populations than those that
occurred. Third, to the extent that racial hostility and lack of empathy
with offenders and their families produce harsher punishments, Minnesota sentencing might be expected to become more severe. The proportions of blacks among the state’s residents and among convicted
offenders increased substantially after 1980.36
In contrast, the federal system’s 281 percent prison growth rate (from
16 inmates per 100,000 US residents in 1987 to 61 in 2009) was far greater
than the all-states growth rate (107 percent) in those years, even though
the annual number of sentenced cases grew only modestly faster in federal
than in state courts.37 One plausible explanation is that the federal system
lacks the budget constraints that limit state prison growth. Perhaps for this
reason the federal commission has never used prison impact assessments to
restrain the severity of recommended sentences. The commission appar35
See Frase (2016, sec. III.B.4): from 1988 through 2006, annual felony convictions increased by 117 percent in Minnesota and by an estimated 70 percent for all states. From
1981 to 1988, Minnesota’s moderate prison growth was exactly equal to its caseload increase, but in later years prison growth exceeded caseload increases. From 2001 to 2015
Minnesota’s prison population, including inmates held in local jails with sentences of over
1 year, increased by 63 percent while the sentenced felony caseload increased by 55 percent (Frase and Mitchell 2017).
36
Minnesota’s black population more than quadrupled from 1980 to 2005 (Frase 2009),
and from 1981 to 2009 the percentage of blacks among sentenced felons rose from 11 percent to 28 percent (MSGC 2017, table 7).
37
See Carson (2018; prison rates) and Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center
(2018, table 5.23.2010): Criminal Defendants Sentenced in US District Courts, by Type
and Length of Sentence, 1945–2010. Sentenced federal offenders increased by 86 percent
from 1988 to 2006; as noted previously, the all-states sentenced felony caseload increased
by 70 percent during this period.
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ently did not view dramatic growth in prison populations, or serious prison
overcrowding, as problems it should address.
There are potential selection bias problems in these comparisons. Is it
plausible to suppose that the adoption of parole abolition guidelines by
itself causes slower prison growth? I believe the answer is yes. Discretionary parole release is subject to politically motivated slowdowns or even
temporary cessation.38 Moreover, the availability of parole encourages
judges to impose unreasonably severe prison terms in reliance on the unreliable and often illusory possibility of early release. The variable nature
of parole release policy also makes it much more difﬁcult for legislators
to predict and take political responsibility for the prison bed and ﬁscal
impacts of severe sentencing laws.
Parole abolition makes these predictions more accurate, especially when
combined with guidelines that increase the uniformity of sentences. Average or below-average prison growth is even more likely in a system in
which sentencing guidelines are created by an independent commission
that takes seriously the goals of avoiding prison overcrowding and setting
priorities for prison use and that incorporates prison bed impact projections into its guidelines development process. Projections can be quite
accurate and credible, making clear the ﬁscal and bed impacts of severe
sentences and the trade-offs that are often necessary: unless taxes are raised
or funds are taken away from nonprison budgets, more severity for crime X
requires less severity for crime Y.
3. Prison Overcrowding. Guidelines are sometimes adopted as a tool
to avoid uncontrolled prison population growth, overcrowding, and all
of the dangers associated with overcrowding. These include reduced security for inmates and staff, insufﬁcient prison space and resources for
treatment programs, and court intervention. Overcrowding is thus another important outcome measure. It is not necessarily redundant with
measures of prison growth. A low-growth jurisdiction can develop serious
overcrowding problems if its prisons are already full and the legislature
declines to fund new construction. A high-growth jurisdiction can avoid
overcrowding by timely expansion of its prison capacity or contracting
with private prisons or other states. Guidelines commissions can manage
prison growth and avoid overcrowding. They can use their sentencing
data to update projected population numbers. These predictions can

38

For several examples, see Reitz (2011, n. 84).
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be used to scale back proposals for severe penalty increases, reduce penalties for some offenses to free up beds for others, and warn the legislature of the need to fund new construction.
However, it is difﬁcult to tell whether guidelines have helped avoid
or reduce prison overcrowding. The federal government collects and
reports data on state and federal prison populations relative to prison capacities, but these data are based on a single, year-end count that may not
be representative of other days throughout the year. Moreover, there is
reason to doubt whether these data are comparable across jurisdictions.
Deﬁnitions of “capacity” vary; some prison systems have raised capacity
simply by adding bunks to existing cells (Zimring 1992). Nor is there any
reason to believe that all state and federal prison authorities have made
equally heavy use of this strategy so that estimates of overcrowding are
understated to approximately equal degree across jurisdictions. Finally,
available data include only prison custody populations and do not take
into account the extent to which jurisdictions have reduced prison overcrowding by placing inmates in overcrowded local jails.
Subject to these caveats, here is what the overcrowding data showed at
year-end 2007, 2008, and 2009 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2008, 2009,
2010). These were the years when, depending on the jurisdiction, prison
rates stopped rising (Carson 2018). These data are reported in two ways:
inmates as a percentage of the highest measure of capacity reported for
that jurisdiction and inmates as a percentage of the lowest reported capacity measure.39 In table 2, “overcrowding” is deﬁned as exceeding
105 percent of the lowest reported capacity measure. The 105 percent
cutoff is used to disregard minor, possibly temporary, overcrowding; use
of the lowest-capacity measure recognizes that prison ofﬁcials may have
reasons to overstate true capacity.
Table 2 shows the overcrowding rates for these three years, broken
down by sentencing system type (Alabama is treated as a nonguidelines
state because its guidelines became effective only for crimes committed
on or after October 1, 2006).
These data suggest that guidelines jurisdictions have been more successful in avoiding prison overcrowding than nonguidelines systems.
39
For example, in 2008, New York reported that its “design” capacity was 57,403, its
“rated” capacity was 59,830, and its “operational” capacity was 60,978, so the ﬁrst of these
represents the “lowest reported capacity measure.” Connecticut did not report capacity information in any of these years; Maine, Illinois, and Nevada did not report in 2007, and
Oregon did not report in 2009.
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TABLE 2
Prison Overcrowding in States With and Without
Guidelines and Discretionary Parole
Percent of Systems That Were
Overcrowded in
System Type (No. of Systems in 2008)

2007

2008

2009

3-Year Means

Guidelines with parole abolition (10)
Guidelines with parole retention (7)
All guidelines systems (17)
No guidelines, parole abolition (6)
No guidelines, parole retention (27)
All nonguidelines systems (33)
All reporting jurisdictions (50)

60
29
47
n.a.∗
58
57
53

50
14
35
67
44
48
44

44
29
38
50
52
52
47

51
24
40
58
51
52
48

SOURCE.—Bureau of Justice Statistics (2008, 2009, 2010).
∗

Two of the six states in this category did not report capacity data.

Within each group, however, parole retention systems were more successful. The difference between parole abolition and retention was particularly strong for states with guidelines; perhaps guidelines states that
retained parole did so precisely because they wanted to (and did) use parole release as a means of combating overcrowding. These ﬁndings suggest the need for parole abolition guidelines systems to include some sort
of emergency release mechanism to relieve prison overcrowding, as the
MPCS recommends (§ 305.8).
4. Other Guidelines Impacts. Little is known about differences among
and between guidelines and nonguidelines jurisdictions concerning two
subjects that suffuse writing about American sentencing: racial disparities
in imprisonment and whether overall punishment severity becomes more
proportionate to crime seriousness.
a. Racial Disparity. Sentencing guidelines reforms seek to reduce sentencing disparities among comparable offenders, particularly disparities related to race and ethnicity (King and Light 2019). Evaluations conducted
by commissions and outside researchers have generally found that this goal
was achieved: racial disparities were reduced (Tonry 1996). However, these
studies have mostly viewed offense severity and offender prior record as
control variables when deﬁning groups of “similarly situated” offenders;
and in some guidelines systems it is possible that the guidelines have
changed these control variables in ways that actually increase racial
disparities. The reasons are that guidelines reforms often seek to increase
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penalties for violent crimes, criminal history scores may increase under
guidelines, and some nonwhite offender groups are more likely to be
convicted of violent crimes or have more extensive prior records.
There do not appear to have been any national-level studies comparing racial disparity in states with and without guidelines, controlling
for relevant confounding variables. Overall, there is no indication that
guidelines states have higher rates of disparity. As of 2014, the most recent year for which national data are available, the 17 states that currently
have some form of sentencing guidelines were widely distributed across
the racial disparity rankings, with about equal numbers in the top (higher
disparity) and bottom halves of the rankings.40
b. Offense Proportionality. A number of sentencing guidelines reforms
are meant to give increased weight to retributive punishment goals and
thus to increase the proportionality of sentence severity relative to offense severity, thereby “making the punishment ﬁt the crime.” However,
as noted above, some guidelines systems give great weight to the offender’s prior record of convictions in making dispositional and durational decisions. There is an inherent trade-off: giving more weight to
prior record means giving less weight to offense severity. Thus, in some
guidelines jurisdictions, the adoption of guidelines may have reduced offense proportionality.
No studies have sought to examine whether prior record receives
greater weight as a sentencing factor following implementation of guidelines. There is limited evidence that guidelines cause criminal history
scores to increase over time (Frase and Mitchell 2017; MSGC 2017).
Such increases may occur because prosecutors ﬁle and retain a larger
number of separate charges in order to increase the severity of current
and future recommended sentences (MSGC 1984). It is possible that
criminal history records have become more extensive even in systems
without guidelines because of improved data systems, the criminogenic
effects of mass incarceration, or both.
II. Major Sentencing Policy Issues
Section I summarized current knowledge about the nature, operation,
and effects of guidelines systems. This section addresses questions for
40

Nellis (2016, table C) reports ratios of black to white per capita prison rates, by state.
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the future. What are the policy implications of experiences with guidelines sentencing in America? What are the essential features of a workable and worthwhile system? What additional features seem highly desirable, even if not essential? Can we reach consensus on what’s good
and what’s not? What are the major arguments pro and con concerning
issues lacking consensus? What additional research is needed to address
these issues?
A. Essential Features
Here are features I believe are essential to well-designed guidelines systems and for which I believe there is widespread support. These features
are present in most guideline systems and model codes or standards, or
the arguments for them are in my view overwhelming. However, I do
not mean to suggest that a system lacking one or more of these features
should be rejected if proposed or abolished if it already exists. The success
of sentencing reform is highly dependent on context (Zimring and
Hawkins 1991, pp. 156–62, 201–4).
1. A Permanent, Balanced, Independent, and Adequately Funded Sentencing Commission. Every jurisdiction needs the kind of sentencing commission found in the best state systems and recommended by the ABA
Standards and the MPCS. In theory, the same work could be done by
a legislative committee or subcommittee. California and a half dozen other
states tried that approach in the 1970s; but several of those abandoned it,
and no state has adopted it since 1979. As Zimring (1976) long ago
warned, legislatures are poorly equipped to develop well-considered
rules to cover case-level sentencing and assess the effects of policies after
they are implemented. Criminal codes are mostly too crude to use as a
template. Legislators are subject to strong law-and-order political pressures. Legislative committees are unlikely to develop and maintain the
necessary statistical databases and substantive policy expertise.
A sentencing commission can develop such data and expertise and is at
least partly insulated from direct electoral pressures. To do its job well, a
commission must be adequately funded, free of legislative or executive
branch interference, balanced politically, and representative of the most
important actors and perspectives within and outside the criminal justice
system. The commission must also be permanent. Some states abolished
their commissions after guidelines went into effect, but that is shortsighted and unwise. Guidelines need monitoring and updating on a reg-
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ular basis or they will not achieve their purposes (and will eventually be
ignored by judges and others). Given the huge costs and impacts of criminal punishment, creating and retaining a well-funded sentencing commission is money well spent.
2. Presumptive Typical-Case Sentences with Speciﬁed Departure Criteria.
Judges must be given at least two kinds of guidance. First, there must be a
common starting point for each kind of case, consisting of the sentence or
sentence range deemed appropriate in that jurisdiction. Second, there
must be standards and illustrative (but not exclusive) lists of permitted
and forbidden factors to consider when deciding whether and by how
much to depart from the applicable starting point. All guidelines systems
have the ﬁrst and most the second. These features are essential not only to
guidelines but to any system governed by the rule of law. Judges need at
least this much guidance when exercising their awesome powers over the
liberty, property, and future life chances of offenders (and their potential
victims).
3. Hybrid Sentencing Theory. Presumptive sentences and departure
standards and factors must accommodate both retributive and crime
control sentencing purposes. No guidelines system—indeed, no modern
sentencing system of any type—has ever adopted a purely retributive or a
purely crime control–focused punishment model, nor should they. Retributive values and the pursuit of crime control goals are both essential
features of any workable and worthwhile sentencing system.
Fundamental fairness to offenders demands that they never be punished more severely than they deserve, even if greater severity would provide cost-effective crime control beneﬁts. The importance of avoiding
undeservedly severe punishment is something about which all proponents
of retributive values agree, even when they strongly disagree about other
aspects of deserved punishment. “Positive” desert theories assert that society has the right and the duty to impose exactly the deserved punishment,
or at least a punishment falling within a very narrow range of severity
(Moore 1997). Negative (or “limiting”) retributive theories posit a range
of deserved punishment. Some negative retributive accounts emphasize
the imprecision of desert assessments and envision a range of “not undeserved” punishment (see, e.g., Morris and Tonry 1990; ALI 2003). Other
negative accounts (e.g., Armstrong 1969; Frase 2013) view desert assessments as reasonably precise, at least as to relative degrees of blameworthiness. These writers propose an asymmetric theory under which it is more
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important to avoid punishment in excess of desert than punishment less
than desert.41
Crime prevention is an essential government function, and governments must spend their limited funds efﬁciently. A purely retributive
model would often require signiﬁcant public expenditures, and signiﬁcantly burden offenders and their families, with limited crime control
beneﬁts. Beneﬁts may be outweighed by their costs and burdens or could
be achieved more effectively or efﬁciently with nonpunitive measures.
Hybrid guidelines models should specify that, within outer bounds set
by retributive principles, custodial sanctions and conditions of community
release should be no more onerous than is necessary to achieve their crime
control purposes (the parsimony principle).
4. Balance between Uniformity and Flexibility. Guidelines must strike
and preserve a workable balance between rule and discretion. Rules tend
to make decisions more consistent and predictable. Discretion promotes
ﬂexibility and efﬁciency, allowing atypical case facts to be considered in
order to do justice and avoid unnecessary burdens and expense. Mandatory minimum sentences statutes are rules that seek to impose excessive
uniformity (in practice, they are only as uniform as prosecutors want
them to be). Traditional indeterminate sentencing, with unfettered judicial and parole discretion, allows excessive ﬂexibility.
Many guidelines systems are more or less “advisory,” with little or no
appellate review even of departure sentences. I believe (and so did the
drafters of the MPCS) that advisory guidelines allow too much case-level
ﬂexibility. Legally binding guidelines with moderate appellate review
provide a better balance between rule and discretion (Reitz 1997). Appel41
Under the asymmetric conception of negative desert limits, undeservedly severe punishment is a serious abuse of government power, whereas failure to give offenders their full
just deserts raises different issues (fairness to other equally culpable offenders who were
punished more severely, fairness to victims and their families). For further discussion,
see Frase (2013). Asymmetric desert limits may be appropriate even under a positive retributive account (Frase 2018a). Desert assessments can err in both directions—too much or
too little. In assessing these inherent risks of error, a positive retributivist could decide that
imposing punishment in excess of desert is normatively “worse” than imposing a less than
fully deserved punishment. Such asymmetry is also a feature of utilitarian/consequentialist
punishment models that incorporate the concept of parsimony—no greater severity than
necessary to achieve crime control and other practical goals; in these models there is no
corresponding directive to avoid penalties that are less severe than necessary. Asymmetry
is a central feature of modern criminal justice systems: the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt and other procedural rules reﬂect deliberate choices to err on the side
of too few criminal convictions rather than too many.
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late review of sentences serves to clarify and enforce guidelines rules and
to aid in development of sentencing policy as common-law courts have
traditionally done, taking into account factual variations and patterns that
a sentencing commission cannot foresee and regulate in advance.
A workable balance is also necessary in the degree to which guidelines
rules are prescriptive (changing prior sentencing norms) or descriptive
(encouraging judges to follow existing norms more consistently). Of
course, when existing sentencing practices are demonstrably unfair or
wasteful, an effort must be made to change them. But existing practice
will often embody practical wisdom or, at least, strongly held views
shared by judges and other practitioners. If guidelines rules are too prescriptive, they invite widespread evasion. When penalties seem too severe, judges are more likely to depart downward, and prosecutors are
more likely to grant charging leniency. When guidelines recommendations seem too lenient, prosecutors can ﬁle and retain additional counts.
All of these processes occurred in Minnesota, where the guidelines
commission took a relatively prescriptive approach (Frase 1993). The
commission sought to increase use of imprisonment for people convicted
of high-severity crimes who had low criminal histories. This goal was
substantially undercut by charging leniency combined with high rates
of downward departure. The commission sought to decrease imprisonment rates for people convicted of low-severity crimes who had sizable
criminal histories. This was increasingly undermined by rising criminal
history scores (due, at least in part, to prosecution decisions) that pushed
many low-severity offenders across the guidelines grid to the recommended prison zone (MSGC 1984).42
5. Resource and Demographic Impact Assessments. Guidelines permit
more accurate projections of the size and composition of future custody
and supervision populations. This allows a jurisdiction to set priorities in
the use of limited correctional resources and to avoid overcrowding by
expanding capacity, adjusting recommended sentences for some crimes,
or both. Such projections, especially when factored into drafting and revision processes, can help a system control the growth of its prison population and avoid serious overcrowding problems.
Similar projections are used in some guidelines states (e.g., Minnesota,
Oregon) to predict the effects of current or proposed penalties on racial
42
For an earlier summary of effects of prescriptive changes in several guidelines systems, see Tonry (1996, pp. 49–54).
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and ethnic disparities. When a penalty is projected to cause or increase
prison disparity, the commission and the legislature can examine it more
closely to make sure it has a strong policy rationale and is narrowly tailored to minimize its disparate impact. There is room for debate as to
how policy makers should respond to predicted new or increased racial
disparate impacts.
B. Contested Guidelines Policy Issues—How Should They Be Resolved?
Substantial policy disagreements are raised by many aspects of guidelines sentencing. Here are some of the major disagreements and my
thoughts about the underlying policy issues. Some relate to coverage—
which crimes and sentencing issues should be regulated? Others relate
to design details that determine how the system works.
1. Coverage. Guidelines systems vary considerably in terms of whether,
and to what extent, they regulate each of the following sentencing matters.
a. Sentencing of Misdemeanor Offenses. Limiting guidelines to felonies,
as a majority of guidelines systems do, makes sense in terms of reform priorities. The more severe penalties given in felony cases impose greater costs
and create greater potentials for disparity. However, failure to regulate misdemeanor sentencing creates problems because of frequent overlap between penalties for more serious misdemeanors and less serious felonies.
Using costly or scarce community-based sentences for misdemeanants
means that fewer of those resources are available for felons. There are also
issues of fairness, proportionality, and crime control when some misdemeanants are punished more severely than some felons; that is sure to occur
if misdemeanor sentencing is unregulated. These problems will be worse if
guidelines do not regulate conditions of nonprison felony sentences.
b. Sentencing of Multiple Current Offenses. One of the curious things
about guidelines is their inconsistent treatment of repeat offenders.
Guidelines closely regulate the ways in which judges take into account
convictions entered before the date of the current sentencing, but sentencing of multiple current convictions is not regulated at all in the majority of systems. Judges retain unfettered discretion to sentence these
multiple convictions concurrently, consecutively, or with a mix of concurrent and consecutive sentences.43 One reason is the complexity of
the subject. Multiple offenses may be closely related in time and place,
43
For a variety of perspectives on sentencing of multiple current offenses, see Ryberg,
Roberts, and de Keijser (2018).
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loosely related, unrelated, similar, or dissimilar. They vary in their underlying circumstances and motivations (single or multiple objectives), similarity to prior offenses, and degree of police inducement (e.g., selling or
buying drugs). Similar concurrent/consecutive choices arise when offenses
are sentenced at the same time but in different courts or when the offender
is serving a previously imposed sentence. Given this complexity, guidelines
should provide only broad presumptive rules subject to departure (Frase
2018a). Most sentences for multiple offenses should be presumptively concurrent, with a few types being presumptively consecutive. Jurisdictions
should also make use of “concurrent-plus” sentencing options that take
account of additional convictions but recommend sentences shorter than
under full consecutive sentencing. Each of these solutions has been implemented in a number of guidelines states.
c. Conditions of Nonprison Sentences. Most guidelines regulate only
decisions about who goes to prison and for how long. This choice reﬂects
in part the desire to give reform priority to the penalties imposing the
highest costs and with the greatest potential for serious disparities. But
nonprison sentences can also be onerous, especially when jail terms up
to 1 year are combined with ﬁnes, other probation conditions, or both.
The absence of detailed guidelines for community-based felony sentences
reﬂects the complexity and case-speciﬁc nature of these decisions and a desire to retain some local control over sentences, particularly when they are
paid for locally and must accommodate widely varying local resources.
Of course, state funding could be provided to expand and maintain adequate community-based sentencing options. Such funding should be provided, along with a charge-back formula, in order to eliminate the “correctional free lunch” problem (Zimring and Hawkins 1991, pp. 211–15).
Local judges and prosecutors in almost all states are free to commit state
prison resources, without ﬁscal or political accountability, by imposing
prison terms on offenders who ought to be sanctioned in the community.
At a minimum, guidelines should do as Oregon and Washington have
done: place presumptive upper limits on the severity of nonprison
sanctions (maximum jail days and “sanction unit” equivalents) for cases
not ordinarily warranting state imprisonment.
d. Decisions to Revoke Probation and Postprison Release. Guidelines systems impose few limits on decisions to revoke conditional release, even
when a substantial prison term may result. Revocations impose substantial public and private costs and in some states account for a high percentage of all prison admissions. Unregulated revocation decisions are
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also another source of sentencing disparity. Decisions to revoke release
can be difﬁcult to regulate if they are primarily offender-based and focus
on whether the offender is too high-risk to remain at liberty or not amenable to supervision. But to the extent that revocation is intended to
sanction and deter violations of release conditions, it involves the kind
of “punishment” decision that can and should be regulated, at least as
to sanction severity. Jurisdictions wishing to limit revocations can also
do so by eliminating unnecessary release conditions and lengthy periods
of supervision (thereby reducing alleged violations) and by providing
guidance, or presumptive rules, specifying kinds of release violations
that justify revocation. Revocations to prison and their impacts on prison
populations can be further limited by rules that limit the duration of
prison or jail sanctions used to sanction violations.
e. Discretionary Parole Release. Some US guidelines systems have
abolished discretionary parole release. A substantial minority have not.
The MPCS recommends abolition; that in my view is the right choice. Unregulated parole release discretion is, prima facie, an affront to transparency
and the rule of law; prison duration is a sentencing decision that should
be made by a judge, in a public courtroom, with the full due process
protections of sentencing proceedings. Proponents of retaining parole discretion have a heavy burden of proof. I do not believe they can satisfy it.
There is no reason to believe that parole boards can accurately and
consistently assess whether individuals have been rehabilitated or for
other reasons are less likely to reoffend. Prisoners know how to “act reformed,” and behavior in a prison environment is sometimes a poor predictor of behavior in the community. Of course, parole guidelines can
make these decisions more consistent. They can also take into account
dynamic high- or low-risk factors that cannot be known at the time of
sentencing. One of the most reliable factors of this type is whether the
offender completed assigned prison programming. But it is not necessary to retain parole discretion in order to take this into account;
good-conduct credits can and should include credit for program completion. Parole discretion is likewise not needed to take advantage of
two other important recidivism predictors: pre-prison offending and
age at release; both can be known or estimated at the time of sentencing.
Some have argued that parole discretion is a necessary safety valve to
relieve prison crowding or that parole abolition may cause prison populations to swell when it becomes public knowledge how long offenders
actually spend in prison (Zimring 1976). It appears, however, that aboli-
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tion is actually associated with slower prison growth—but only when combined with adoption of sentencing guidelines. On the other hand, available
data suggest that, with or without guidelines, prison overcrowding is more
often found in systems that have abolished parole release discretion than in
states that retained it.
One solution to overcrowding is to adopt “control release” procedures
as recommended by the MPCS (§ 305.8) The code provides that when
prison population exceeds operational capacity (which the code deﬁnes)
for 30 days, the director of the department of corrections may declare “an
overcrowding state of emergency” and advance inmate release dates by
speciﬁed amounts, award additional good-time credits, or advance individuals’ release dates on the basis of reliable risk-assessment measures.44
Here are some other essential features of any system, with or without
guidelines, that chooses to abolish parole release discretion:
•

•

•

Offenders should receive substantial sentence reductions for good conduct and program participation. Any particular ﬁgure is arbitrary, but
higher credits are needed in systems with relatively long prison terms.
The credit should exceed the 15 percent granted in the federal system
and should generally fall within the 30–35 percent range adopted by
most guidelines states and the MPCS (§ 305.1).
There should be other grounds for exceptional early release. A
“second-look” procedure, as recommended by the MPCS (§ 305.6),
would permit courts to reconsider and reduce very long sentences that
no longer seem appropriate (and that in our time are rarely commuted). Other procedures should permit release for advanced age, serious illness or inﬁrmity, exigent family circumstances, or other compelling reasons (§ 305.7).
Periods of postprison supervision and sanctions for violations of release conditions should be independent of the remaining unserved
prison term at the time of release. This is the approach in several
guidelines systems and is endorsed by the MPCS (§ 6.09[5]). Supervision periods and sanctions should be as short as possible and be selected in light of research on recidivism rates after varying periods of
time on release. In systems retaining parole, and in some parole abolition systems, the supervision period, and the maximum sanction for

44
The cited Model Penal Code provision also recommends procedures to deal with jail,
probation, and postprison supervision populations that exceed operational capacity.
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release violations, are each set equal to the remaining prison term.
This provides both too much and too little control. Offenders who
“max out” their original sentence before release (many of whom are
high-risk) have little or no period on supervision and little or no
threatened revocation sanction. Those released earliest (many are
low-risk) have the longest supervision term and the most time in
prison if they are revoked.
f. Other Important Decisions That Are Rarely Regulated but May Need
to Be. Important decisions that affect sentencing occur before sentencing occurs. These decisions, which no guidelines system has adequately
addressed, can fundamentally undercut guidelines rules and undermine
guidelines goals.
Prosecutorial Charging and Bargaining: Prosecutors “sentence” large
numbers of offenders every day. They effectively impose the most lenient
possible sentence when they decline to ﬁle provable charges. They impose probation-like obligations as conditions of pretrial diversion. They
use their charging powers to expand or contract the judge’s sentencing
options when they decide whether to invoke a mandatory penalty or to
select a conviction offense to trigger a recommended guidelines sentence
they prefer. They decide whether to allow concurrent sentencing and
shape the offender’s criminal record when they dismiss or retain provable
counts. Washington is the only guidelines state that has attempted to deal
with prosecutorial discretion, and it did so only to a very limited extent
(Boerner and Lieb 2001). No guidelines jurisdiction has addressed pretrial diversion and deferred adjudication. The MPCS does (§§ 6.02A
and 6.02B).
Failures to regulate prosecutorial discretion result from practical and
political difﬁculties. Even so, the nature and scope of the problem need
recognition. In any given case, the prosecution charging decision may be
too severe or too lenient. Unreasonable severity is not a serious problem
in well-designed guidelines systems that set reasonable penalty levels,
avoid mandatory minimums, and retain substantial judicial discretion
to depart downward from typical-case guidelines. In systems lacking
these safeguards, prosecutorial discretion is more likely to undermine
the guidelines’ goals. Thus one solution to excessive prosecutorial severity is to create well-designed sentencing rules.
Excessive prosecutorial leniency is unlikely to pose a systemic problem
in any American jurisdiction. Nor is there any practical way to prevent
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the occasional grant of excessive leniency. US prosecutors deﬁne their
roles in “adversary” terms (Pizzi 1999) and face electoral pressure not
to appear “soft on crime.” In most cases they are motivated to seek as severe a sentence as the evidence will support.45 Unless victims are given
broad rights of private prosecution, there is no practical way for courts to
identify, let alone control, excessive leniency.
Pretrial Release and Detention Decisions: Offenders in pretrial detention receive a “custody sentence” in all but name. Their detention makes
it more likely they will be convicted and receive a formal custody sentence. If released pending trial, conditions are often indistinguishable
from probation conditions. No guidelines system has addressed these
problems, in part because their solution would almost certainly require
guideline rules governing nonprison sentences (now largely absent from
existing systems). There is no reason in principle why guidelines could
not set presumptive limits for pretrial detention and regulate conditions
of pretrial release. Rules could provide that offenders normally may not
be held in pretrial detention longer than the recommended maximum jail
or prison sentence under applicable sentencing guidelines and that conditions of release in the aggregate may not be more onerous than could be
imposed following conviction. However, without stricter standards on
prosecutorial charging decisions, such limits might encourage (further)
overcharging.
2. Design and Details. Numerous details need to be considered when
designing a guidelines system about which little consensus has emerged
favoring one approach over another. Here is a short, high-priority list.
a. Use of a Grid, Multiple Grids, or No Grid. Sentencing grids convey a
lot of information in a simple form but tend to limit sentencing considerations to two dimensions. Multiple grids allow different formulas for different kinds of crimes but make inconsistency in degrees of severity or other
treatment more likely. Worksheets allow more factors to be considered and
permit criminal history to be given different deﬁnitions and weights for different offenses (Hester et al., forthcoming). However, worksheet calcula-

45
Even when American prosecutors are appointed, as in the federal system, they do not
seem predisposed to grant undue leniency (I base this conclusion on 35 years of supervising
students in my law school’s federal prosecution and defense clinics). For that reason, the
much-criticized “relevant conduct” enhancements under the federal guidelines (USSC
2016, sec. 1B1.3), designed to counteract prosecutorial leniency, appear to be addressing
a nonexistent problem.
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tions tend to be more complex, and their greater detail and seeming completeness may unduly discourage departures.
Another set of issues concerns relations between the range of recommended sentences and statutory minimums and maximums. Some
guidelines systems use mandatory minimum penalties as a base and build
up, while others set guidelines sentences independently, subject to override by a mandatory. The latter approach gives less weight to mandatories and thus is preferable because mandatory penalties fail to provide a
reasonable balance between rule and discretion. Some guidelines systems
use statutory maximums to set the tops of the recommended ranges for
offenders with the highest criminal history. That seems unwise; it occupies
all of the statutory range, making sentence enhancements based on aggravated offense factors impossible. It also overpunishes high-history offenders whose crimes lack such factors.
b. Criminal History Scoring and Impact on Recommended Sentences.
Existing guidelines rules on criminal history vary greatly. Differences include their stated rationales; the choice and weighting of score components; look-back limits (decay and gap rules); limits on eligibility for
the highest score categories; validation of scores and score components
as proxies for recidivism risk; magnitude of enhancements; and overall
effects of enhancements on prison costs, prison-use priorities, racial
disparities, and sentence proportionality relative to the conviction offense. Criminal history enhancements need closer scrutiny and curtailment in all of these areas (Frase 2013; Frase et al. 2015; Frase and
Roberts, forthcoming). Rationales need to be clearly stated. If one rationale is that prior record is a proxy for recidivism risk, the predictive accuracy and efﬁciency of the score and its components must be validated.
Problematic score components need especially close attention: juvenile
record, misdemeanor convictions, custody status points, heavy weighting
of higher-severity prior felonies, and formulaic enhancement based on
prior and current offense similarity. Look-back periods need to be
shorter (or added where they are currently missing), with more credit
given for crime-free gap periods. Eligibility for inclusion in the highest
history score categories should require one or more violent or very serious prior crimes. Finally, all of the potential adverse effects of each system’s criminal history enhancements ( prison costs, racial disparities, etc.)
need to be measured and kept as low as possible.
c. Use of Validated Risk Assessment Tools at Sentencing. Very few guidelines
systems use such tools, and those that do seem to use them only after the
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recommended sentence has been decided, based solely or primarily on offense severity and prior record. This may reﬂect the continued inﬂuence on
guidelines policy makers of just deserts sentencing theory or an assumption
that such assessments should be based only on prior convictions that have
been reliably determined by a court. However, most criminal history scores
are not well designed to serve as proxies for recidivism risk. They typically
include prior record factors of unknown or doubtful risk and ignore
nonprior record factors that are known to be strongly associated with lower
or higher risk.
The use of nonrecord factors must, however, overcome important
normative concerns. Strong objections are made to such factors as
marriage or other family circumstances, past and current employment,
drug and alcohol use, current or end-of-sentence offender age, and gender. These factors are contested because they do not (or often do not)
reﬂect culpable offender choices, and many have a disparate negative impact on nonwhite offenders (Starr 2015; Tonry 2019). The strength of
normative objections to contested nonhistory factors may depend on
how they are used (Frase 2014). For example, it may be appropriate to
mitigate penalties for middle-aged and older offenders even if we conclude that fairness prohibits enhancing penalties for offenders in their
late teens and early 20s (who cannot help being in high-risk age groups).
Another important variable concerns the kinds of future offending
sought to be prevented. Many risk assessment instruments were validated using broad outcome measures such as arrest or conviction for
any crime within X years. Granted, it is much more difﬁcult to predict
serious violent crimes, since they are relatively rare events. But if and
when risk assessment tools are developed that predict such crimes with
relatively few false positives, it can be argued that fairness to potential
victims justiﬁes using them (Frase 2011). That may be true even if they
rely on socioeconomic or legal lifestyle choices, as long as sentence severity does not exceed the offender’s deserved punishment for the current offense or offenses.
d. What to Do about Racial Disparate Impacts. Many sentencing rules
have an adverse disparate impact on nonwhite offenders. These result
from not only racial differences in the type and seriousness of conviction
offenses (which may or may not reﬂect racial differences in behavior) but
also racial differences in prior record. Black and Native American
offenders tend to have higher criminal history scores than whites, especially non-Hispanic whites (Frase 2009, 2013; Frase, Roberts, and Hester,
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forthcoming a). Some guidelines systems have taken advantage of improved data and increased sentence predictability to examine past and
predicted future impacts of guidelines rules on racial disparity. Demographic impact assessments allow a commission to identify and measure
foreseeable disparate impacts; they should be an essential feature of a
guidelines system.
But how should the results of these assessments be used? Some (Mauer
2007; Tonry 2011) argue that any sentencing rule with a demonstrated or
predicted disparate impact should be presumed invalid, with the burden
being on proponents to provide data and convincing arguments to justify
the rule. But we need much more debate on what justiﬁcations could
overcome such a presumption. In short, when are demonstrated racial
disparate impacts unacceptable? The easiest cases are those in which
the rule lacks any convincing justiﬁcation. Only a few rules meet this
standard; the crack/powder distinction is a clear example. Strong objections can also be raised when the goals supposedly achieved could
be equally well served by a more narrowly tailored rule with less disparate
impact. An example is overbroad “school-zone” drug laws that, given residential patterns, are much more likely to apply to nonwhite offenders
(such laws are often unnecessarily broad, e.g., enhancing penalties for
crimes committed in the middle of the night; Mauer and Cole 2011).
A substantial argument can be made against penalty enhancements that
reﬂect racial proﬁling or other systematic bias (e.g., black offenders have
more drug priors than whites because of law enforcement targeting, not racial differences in drug offending). Many enhancements with disparate racial impact could also be attacked because the harms they cause (including
worsening of disadvantage and exacerbating entrenched social inequalities)
outweigh the value of retributive or crime control punishment (Frase 2009,
2013). Ruth and Reitz (2003, pp. 103, 116) argued that a penalty with disparate impact should be allowed only if it helps prevent serious crimes.

III. Priority Issues for Research
Much is unknown about the effects of variations in guidelines systems on
outcomes and inmate populations. Examples include the composition
and permanence of the commission, use of grids versus worksheets, each
system’s location on the mandatory-to-advisory continuum, and retention or abolition of parole release discretion.
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Some research topics are primarily methodological; solving these
puzzles will open up greater potential for comparative research across
diverse guidelines systems:
•
•

•

measures of “disparity” and disparity reduction that are comparable
across jurisdictions;
measurement of prison,probation, andpostprisonsupervisionpopulation
growth (e.g., per capita or percentage change), and how to relate those
measures to variations in systems’ structure, design, or operation;
measures of prison overcrowding and of the extent to which supervision populations exceed operational capacity that are comparable
across jurisdictions.

Other priority research topics concern whether some kinds of guidelines
are better able to achieve widely shared sentencing reform goals:
•

•

•

•

•

•
•

How do different kinds of guidelines relate to variations in sentencing disparities, growth in prison and jail populations, correctional
overcrowding, and levels of racial disproportionality?
Do prior records receive more weight at sentencing in jurisdictions
with guidelines than in those without guidelines? Do criminal history
scores rise more under guidelines than under nonguidelines systems,
and if so, why?
How well do criminal history scores, score components, and nonrecord risk factors predict recidivism, especially for violent or other
serious crime? This research has been done only for the federal system, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
How well have less commonly employed guidelines provisions worked
in practice? Examples include coverage of misdemeanors, structuring
of sentences for multiple current convictions, limits on severity of nonprison sentences, and limits on custodial sanctions for violations of
probation and postprison release conditions.
Are some kinds of guidelines more or less susceptible to being undermined by unregulated prosecutor charging and plea bargaining
decisions?
Should pretrial detention, pretrial release conditions, pretrial diversion, and deferred adjudication be regulated, and if so, how?
What do judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, offenders, probation
ofﬁcers, and other correctional ofﬁcers think about various guidelines

Forty Years of American Sentencing Guidelines

•

•

127

rules, and how do their opinions support or undermine guidelines
reforms?46
What is the public’s opinion about guidelines rules, and how well do
such attitudes reﬂect the content of the rules?47 To what extent does
public opinion support or undermine guidelines reforms?
Why have guidelines been adopted, or survived, in some states but
not in others?

IV. Conclusion
Although American guidelines systems share many common features,
each is unique in some ways. This diversity is not surprising, given the
distinctive histories and politics of each jurisdiction. In the end, sentencing reform is highly contingent as to both place and time (Zimring and
Hawkins 1991). Nevertheless, it is useful to identify and seek to expand
areas of consensus about what a well-designed sentencing guidelines system should look like. I have proposed a short list of essential features of
such a system and have discussed policy arguments, practical considerations, and research that may help to resolve other, more contested issues.
A number of guidelines states have adopted most of the essential features I
identify and satisfactorily resolved many contested issues. Overall, and recognizing that any “best of” list is inherently imprecise and subjective, I believe that the guidelines systems in ﬁve states qualify, each in its own way, as
models: Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington
(for further details, see Frase [2013, chap. 3]).
But even if we can eventually agree on what an ideal guidelines system
should look like, some jurisdictions will be unable or unwilling to adopt
all of its features. In some, an incomplete system may be “as good as it
gets.” Such guidelines may be better than if there were no guidelines at
all. This characterization ﬁts the post-Booker advisory federal guidelines,
but also the guidelines of some states. Pennsylvania, for example, retained
parole release discretion, has minimal appellate review or interpretive case
law, and has experienced much faster prison population growth than the

46
The federal sentencing commission has conducted a series of surveys of judges’ views
about the operation of the guidelines ( USSC 2003, 2010, 2015).
47
For a survey of public attitudes about punishment of four federal crimes (drug trafﬁcking, bank robbery, immigration offenses, and fraud), with comparisons to the corresponding federal guidelines sentencing range, see USSC (1997).
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average state (Carson 2018). However, Pennsylvania’s guidelines usefully
structure nonprison sanctions and provide guidance on the choice of punishment purposes. Pennsylvania’s commission has an active research program and has conducted cutting-edge work on risk assessment scales and
use of criminal history as a predictor of recidivism.
Saying that an incomplete guidelines system is better than none poses
the question, what alternative sentencing structures are possible? No
other sentencing reform of comparable scope has been implemented
in even a single US state or federal jurisdiction in the past four decades.
The only competing model is the statutory presumptive sentence approach that California and several other states adopted beginning in
1976, but 1979 was the last year such a system was adopted. In theory it
would be possible to design a sentencing system based on restorative justice principles, but no such effort has been made in any American jurisdiction. Nor, to my knowledge, has any other comprehensive sentencing
reform model been proposed or widely discussed.48 By contrast, 22 jurisdictions adopted guidelines, and 19 still use them.
There are two basic choices, each with two alternative versions: sentencing guidelines and traditional unfettered judicial sentencing, each
with or without parole release discretion. Discretionary sentencing
and parole, however, are no more defensible today than they were when
they began to fall from favor in the 1970s (ALI 2003; Frase 2013). That
is why both the ABA (1994) and the ALI (2017) favored parole-abolition
sentencing guidelines. Parole-abolition guidelines strike a better balance
between rule and discretion than discretionary sentencing and releasing
and permit more rational, ﬁscally responsible, and transparent decisions
to be made about who should go to prison and for how long. They have
proved to be workable and sustainable in a variety of states, in some cases
for decades.

48
The Justice Reinvestment ( JRI) programs sponsored in recent years by the Council
on State Governments (2018) could perhaps be seen as promoting systemwide reforms
comparable in scope to sentencing guidelines. But JRI programs focus on efﬁcient achievement of crime control goals and do not give much attention to widely felt concerns about
sentencing proportionality and disparity. It is also unclear what the long-term effects of
JRI programs will be, especially where those programs have not created or strengthened
state and local institutions involved in criminal justice operations and tasked with longterm planning (including, and especially, sentencing commissions).
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Unstructured, highly discretionary punishment should be unacceptable in any state claiming to be governed by the rule of law. There is
no better reform alternative than the parole-abolition guidelines model.

REFERENCES

ABA (American Bar Association). 1979. Standards Relating to the Administration of
Criminal Justice. 2nd ed.: Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures. Washington,
DC: American Bar Association.
———. 1994. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Sentencing. 3rd ed. Washington, DC: American Bar Association.
ALI (American Law Institute). 2003. Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Report. Philadelphia: American Law Institute.
———. 2017. Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Proposed Final Draft. Philadelphia:
American Law Institute.
Arkansas Sentencing Commission. 2018. Sentencing Standards Grid Offense Seriousness Rankings and Related Material. https://www.arsentencing.com/.
Armstrong, K. G. 1969. “The Retributivist Hits Back.” In The Philosophy of Punishment: A Collection of Papers, edited by H. B. Acton. London: Macmillan.
Boerner, David, and Roxanne Lieb. 2001. “Sentencing Reform in the Other
Washington.” In Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 28, edited by Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2008. Prisoners in 2007. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice.
———. 2009. Prisoners in 2008. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice.
———. 2010. Prisoners in 2009. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice.
Carnes, Teresa. 1993. “Sentencing Reform in Alaska.” Federal Sentencing Reporter
6:134–37.
Carson, E. Ann. 2018. “Imprisonment Rate of Sentenced Prisoners under the
Jurisdiction of State or Federal Correctional Authorities.” https://www.bjs
.gov/index.cfm?typnps.
Council on State Governments. 2018. Justice Reinvestment. Washington, DC:
CSG Justice Center. https://csgjusticecenter.org/jr.
DC Sentencing Commission. 2018. 2017 Annual Report. Washington, DC: DC
Sentencing and Criminal Code Revision Commission. https://scdc.dc.gov
/node/1328161.
Doob, Anthony. 1995. “The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines:
If You Don’t Know Where You Are Going, You Might Not Get There.” In
The Politics of Sentencing Reform, edited by Chris Clarkson and Rod Morgan.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Frankel, Marvin. 1973. Criminal Sentences: Law without Order. New York: Hill &
Wang.

130

Richard S. Frase

Frase, Richard S. 1993. “Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing Guidelines: The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota.” Cornell Journal of
Law and Public Policy 2:279–337.
———. 1995. “Lessons of State Guideline Reforms.” Federal Sentencing Reporter
8:39– 41.
———. 2005. “State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues.” Columbia Law Review 105:1190–1232.
———. 2009. “What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in Minnesota’s Prison and Jail Populations?” In Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 38, edited by Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
———. 2011. “Can Above-Desert Penalties Be Justiﬁed by Competing Deontological Theories?” In Retributivism Has a Past: Has It a Future? edited by Michael Tonry. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2013. Just Sentencing: Principles and Procedures for a Workable System.
New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2014. “Recurring Policy Issues of Guidelines (and Non-Guidelines)
Sentencing: Risk Assessments, Criminal History Enhancements, and the Enforcement of Release Conditions.” Federal Sentencing Reporter 26:145–57.
———. 2015a. “The Treatment of Multiple Current Offenses.” In Criminal
History Enhancements Sourcebook, edited by Richard S. Frase, Julian V. Roberts,
Rhys Hester, and Kelly Lyn Mitchell. Minneapolis: Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice.
———. 2015b. “Varying Binding Effects of Guidelines—the Mandatoryto-Advisory Continuum.” Minneapolis: Sentencing Guidelines Resource
Center, Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. https://
sentencing.umn.edu/content/varying-binding-effects-guidelines-mandatory
-advisory-continuum.
———. 2016. “Sentencing Policies and Practices in Minnesota.” In Oxford Handbooks Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://www.oxfordhandbooks
.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935383.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935383
-e-148?printppdf.
———. 2018a. “Principles and Procedures for Sentencing of Multiple Current
Offenses.” In Sentencing Multiple Crimes, edited by Jesper Ryberg, Julian V.
Roberts, and Jan W. de Keijser. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2018b. “Suspended Sentences and Free-Standing Probation Orders in
US Guidelines Systems: A Survey and Assessment.” Law and Contemporary
Problems 82(1).
Frase, Richard S., and Kelly Lyn Mitchell. 2017. “Why Are Minnesota’s Prison
Populations Continuing to Rise in an Era of Decarceration?” Federal Sentencing Reporter 30:114 –24.
Frase, Richard S., and Julian V. Roberts, eds. Forthcoming. Paying for the Past:
Exploring the Intended and Unintended Consequences of Prior Record Sentencing
Enhancements. New York: Oxford University Press.
Frase, Richard S., Julian V. Roberts, and Rhys Hester. Forthcoming a. “Disparate Impact on Minority Offenders.” In Paying for the Past: Exploring the

Forty Years of American Sentencing Guidelines

131

Intended and Unintended Consequences of Prior Record Sentencing Enhancements,
edited by Richard S. Frase and Julian V. Roberts. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. Forthcoming b. “Impact of Criminal History Enhancements on
Prison Bed Needs and Costs.” In Paying for the Past: Exploring the Intended
and Unintended Consequences of Prior Record Sentencing Enhancements, edited
by Richard S. Frase and Julian V. Roberts. New York: Oxford University
Press.
———. Forthcoming c. “Magnitude of Criminal History Impacts on Sentence
Severity.” In Paying for the Past: Exploring the Intended and Unintended Consequences of Prior Record Sentencing Enhancements, edited by Richard S. Frase
and Julian V. Roberts. New York: Oxford University Press.
Frase, Richard S., Julian V. Roberts, Rhys Hester, and Kelly Lyn Mitchell. 2015.
Criminal History Enhancements Sourcebook. Minneapolis: Robina Institute of
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. https://sentencing.umn.edu/content
/criminal-history-enhancement-sourcebook.
Grifﬁn, Burt W., and Lewis R. Katz. 2002. “Sentencing Consistency: Basic
Principles Instead of Numerical Grids.” Case Western Reserve Law Review
53:1–75.
Griset, Pamela L. 1999. “Criminal Sentencing in Florida: Determinate Sentencing’s Hollow Shell.” Crime and Delinquency 45:316–33.
Hester, Rhys. 2015. “Prior Offense Weighting and Special Eligibility Rules.” In
Criminal History Enhancements Sourcebook, edited by Richard S. Frase, Julian V.
Roberts, Rhys Hester, and Kelly Lyn Mitchell. Minneapolis: Robina Institute
of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice.
Hester, Rhys, Richard S. Frase, Julia Laskorunsky, and Kelly Lyn Mitchell.
Forthcoming. “Rethinking the Role of Criminal History in Sentencing.” In
Handbook on Corrections and Sentencing: Sentencing Policies and Practices in the
21st Century. New York: Routledge.
Hester, Rhys, Richard S. Frase, Julian V. Roberts, and Kelly Lyn Mitchell. 2018.
“Prior Record Enhancements at Sentencing: Unsettled Justiﬁcations and Unsettling Consequences.” In Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 47,
edited by Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center. 2018. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics. Albany: University at Albany, State University of New York. https://
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/tost_5.html#5_ab.
Hofer, Paul. 2019. “Federal Sentencing after Booker.” In American Sentencing,
edited by Michael Tonry. Vol. 48 of Crime and Justice: A Review of Research,
edited by Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kansas Sentencing Commission. 2018. FY 2017 Annual Report. Topeka: Kansas
Sentencing Commission. http://sentencing.ks.gov/document-center/annual
-reports.
King, Ryan D., and Michael Light. 2019. “Have Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Sentencing Declined?” In American Sentencing, edited by Michael Tonry.
Vol. 48 of Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, edited by Michael Tonry.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

132

Richard S. Frase

Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy. 2018. Maryland
Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Version 9.2. College Park: University of Maryland. http://www.msccsp.org/Guidelines/Default.aspx.
Massachusetts Sentencing Commission. 2014. Survey of Sentencing Practices, FY
2013. Boston: Massachusetts Sentencing Commission. https://www.mass
.gov/lists/surveys-of-massachusetts-sentencing-practices.
Mauer, Marc. 2007. “Racial Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities.” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 5:19– 46.
Mauer, Marc, and David Cole. 2011. “Five Myths about Americans in Prison.”
Washington Post, June 17.
Miethe, Terrence, and Charles Moore. 1985. “Socio-economic Disparities
under Determinate Sentencing Systems: A Comparison of Pre- and Postguideline Practices in Minnesota.” Criminology 23:337–63.
Mitchell, Kelly Lyn. 2015a. “Prior Juvenile Adjudications.” In Criminal History
Enhancements Sourcebook, edited by Richard S. Frase, Julian V. Roberts, Rhys
Hester, and Kelly Lyn Mitchell. Minneapolis: Robina Institute of Criminal
Law and Criminal Justice.
———. 2015b. “Prior Misdemeanor Convictions.” In Criminal History
Enhancements Sourcebook, edited by Richard S. Frase, Julian V. Roberts, Rhys
Hester, and Kelly Lyn Mitchell. Minneapolis: Robina Institute of Criminal
Law and Criminal Justice.
———. 2017. Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines by the Numbers. Minneapolis: Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. https://sentencing
.umn.edu/content/sentencing-commissions-and-guidelines-numbers.
Moore, Michael. 1997. Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law. Oxford: Clarendon.
Morris, Norval, and Michael Tonry. 1990. Between Prison and Probation: Intermediate Punishments in a Rational Sentencing System. New York: Oxford University Press.
MSGC (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission). 1984. The Impact of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines: Three Year Evaluation. St. Paul: Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission.
———. 2017. 2016 Sentencing Practices: Annual Summary Statistics for Felony
Offenders. St. Paul: Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission.
———. 2018. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary. St. Paul: Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission.
National Center for State Courts. 2008. State Sentencing Guidelines: Proﬁles and
Continuum. Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts. http://www
.ncsc.org/Topics/Criminal/Sentencing/Resource-Guide.aspx.
Nellis, Ashley. 2016. The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State
Prisons. Washington, DC: Sentencing Project.
Oldroyd, Richard J. 1994. “Utah’s Conjoint Guidelines for Sentencing and Parole.” Overcrowded Times 5(1):1,8–10.
Parent, Dale P. 1988. Structuring Criminal Sentences: The Evolution of Minnesota’s
Sentencing Guidelines. Stoneham, MA: Butterworth Legal.

Forty Years of American Sentencing Guidelines

133

Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. 2017. Annual Report 2016. Harrisburg:
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications
-and-research/annual-reports.
———. 2018. Proposed Sentence Risk Assessment Instrument, April 28, 2018.
Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. http://pcs.la.psu.edu
/news/guidelines/proposed-risk-assessment-instrument.
Pew Charitable Trusts. 2018. “National Prison Rate Continues to Decline Amid
Sentencing, Re-entry Reforms.” Philadelphia: Pew Charitable Trusts. http://
www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2018/01/16/national
-prison-rate-continues-to-decline-amid-sentencing-re-entry-reforms.
Pizzi, William T. 1999. Trials without Truth: Why Our System of Criminal Trials
Has Become an Expensive Failure and What We Need to Do to Rebuild It. New
York: New York University Press.
Porter, Nicole D. 2014. “Racial Impact Statements.” Washington, DC: Sentencing
Project. https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racial-impact-statements/.
Reitz, Kevin R. 1997. “Sentencing Guidelines Systems and Sentence Appeals: A
Comparison of Federal and State Experiences.” Northwestern University Law
Review 91:1441–1506.
———. 2011. “Reporter’s Study: The Question of Parole Release Authority.” In
Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Tentative Draft no. 2. Philadelphia: American
Law Institute.
———. 2018. “Measuring Change in Incarceration Scale.” Berkeley Journal of
Criminal Law 23.
Roberts, Julian V. 2015a. “Custody Status as a Criminal History Enhancement.”
In Criminal History Enhancements Sourcebook, edited by Richard S. Frase, Julian
V. Roberts, Rhys Hester, and Kelly Lyn Mitchell. Minneapolis: Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice.
———. 2015b. “Justifying Criminal History Enhancements at Sentencing.” In
Criminal History Enhancements Sourcebook, edited by Richard S. Frase, Julian
V. Roberts, Rhys Hester, and Kelly Lyn Mitchell. Minneapolis: Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice.
———. 2015c. “Severity Premium for Similar Prior Offending: Patterning
Rules.” In Criminal History Enhancements Sourcebook, edited by Richard S.
Frase, Julian V. Roberts, Rhys Hester, and Kelly Lyn Mitchell. Minneapolis:
Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice.
Roberts, Julian V., and Andrew von Hirsch, eds. 2010. Previous Convictions at
Sentencing: Theoretical and Applied Perspectives. Oxford: Hart.
Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. 2018. Sentencing
Guidelines Resource Center. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. https://
sentencing.umn.edu/.
Ruth, Henry, and Kevin R. Reitz. 2003. The Challenge of Crime: Rethinking Our
Response. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ryberg, Jesper, Julian V. Roberts, and Jan W. de Keijser, eds. 2018. Sentencing
Multiple Crimes. New York: Oxford University Press.

134

Richard S. Frase

Starr, Sonja B. 2015. “The New Proﬁling: Why Punishment Based on Poverty
and Identity Is Unconstitutional and Wrong.” Federal Sentencing Reporter
27:229–36.
Tonry, Michael. 1988. “Structuring Sentencing.” In Crime and Justice: A Review
of Research, vol. 10, edited by Michael Tonry and Norval Morris. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
———. 1996. Sentencing Matters. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2010. “The Questionable Relevance of Previous Convictions to Punishments for Later Crimes.” In Previous Convictions at Sentencing: Theoretical
and Applied Perspectives, edited by Julian V. Roberts and Andrew von Hirsch.
Oxford: Hart.
———. 2011. Punishing Race: A Continuing American Dilemma. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2019. “Predictions of Dangerousness in Sentencing: Déjà Vu All Over
Again.” In American Sentencing, edited by Michael Tonry. Vol. 48 of Crime
and Justice: A Review of Research, edited by Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ulmer, Jeffery T. 2019. “Criminal Courts as Inhabited Institutions: Making
Sense of Difference and Similarity in Sentencing.” In American Sentencing,
edited by Michael Tonry. Vol. 48 of Crime and Justice: A Review of Research,
edited by Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
US Department of Justice. 1996. National Assessment of Structured Sentencing.
Washington, DC: US Department of Justice.
———. 1998. National Survey of State Sentencing Structures. Washington, DC:
US Department of Justice.
USSC (US Sentencing Commission). 1997. National Sample Survey: Public Opinion
on Sentencing Federal Crimes. Washington, DC: US Sentencing Commission.
https://www.ussc.gov/research/research-reports/survey-public-perceptions
-and-federal-sentencing-guidelines.
———. 2003. Survey of Article III Judges on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Washington, DC: US Sentencing Commission. https://www.ussc.gov
/research/topical-index-publications#surveys.
———. 2010. Results of Survey of United States District Judges January 2010 through
March 2010. Washington, DC: US Sentencing Commission. https://www.ussc
.gov/research/topical-index-publications#surveys.
———. 2015. Results of Survey of United States District Judges: Modiﬁcation and Revocation of Probation and Supervised Release. Washington, DC: US Sentencing
Commission. https://www.ussc.gov/research/research-reports/results-survey
-united-states-district-judges-modiﬁcation-and-revocation-probation-and
-supervised.
———. 2016. Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Washington, DC: US Sentencing Commission. https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2016-guidelines-manual.
———. 2018. 2017 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics. Washington, DC: US
Sentencing Commission. https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook-2017.

Forty Years of American Sentencing Guidelines

135

Utah Sentencing Commission. 2017. 2017 Adult Sentencing and Release Guidelines. Salt Lake City: Utah Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.
https://justice.utah.gov/Sentencing.
Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission. 2017. 2017 Annual Report. Richmond: Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission. http://www.vcsc.virginia
.gov/reports.html.
———. 2018. “Nonviolent Risk Assessment, Larceny.” Richmond: Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission. http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/worksheets.html.
Washington State Caseload Forecast Council. 2018. Statistical Summary of Adult
Felony Sentencing, Fiscal Year 2017. Olympia: Washington State Caseload Forecast Council. http://www.cfc.wa.gov/default.htm.
Watts, Alexis L. 2016. “The Composition of Sentencing Commissions.” Minneapolis: Robina Institute on Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. https://
sentencing.umn.edu/content/composition-sentencing-commissions.
———. 2017. “Sentencing Guidelines and Correctional Resource Management.”
Minneapolis: Robina Institute on Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. https://
sentencing.umn.edu/content/depth-sentencing-guidelines-and-correctional
-resource-management.
———. 2018a. “Sentencing Guideline Grids.” Minneapolis: Robina Institute on
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. https://sentencing.umn.edu/content
/depth-sentencing-guideline-grids.
———. 2018b. “Sentencing Guidelines and Discretionary Parole Release.” Minneapolis: Robina Institute on Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. https://
sentencing.umn.edu/content/depth-sentencing-guidelines-and-discretionary
-parole-release.
Zimring, Franklin E. 1976. “Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: A
Consumer’s Guide to Sentencing Reform.” 1976 Hastings Center Report.
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/occasional_papers/16/.
———. 1992. “Are State Prisons Undercrowded?” Federal Sentencing Reporter
4:347– 48.
———. 2005. “Penal Policy and Penal Legislation in Recent American Experience.” Stanford Law Review 58:323–38.
———. 2010. “The Scale of Imprisonment in the United States: Twentieth
Century Patterns and Twenty-First Century Prospects.” Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology 100:1225– 46.
Zimring, Franklin E., and Gordon Hawkins. 1991. The Scale of Imprisonment.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

